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[1071] 
The Evolution of Unconstitutionality in  
Sex Offender Registration Laws 
Catherine L. Carpenter* and Amy E. Beverlin** 
More is not always better. Consider sex offender registration laws. Initially anchored 
by rational basis, registration schemes have spiraled out of control because legislators, 
eager to please a fearful public, have been given unfettered freedom by a deferential 
judiciary. 
 
This Article does not challenge the state’s legislative power to enact sex offender 
registration laws. Instead, this Article posits that, even if sex offender registration schemes 
initially were constitutional, serially amended sex offender registration schemes—what 
this Article dubs super-registration schemes—are not. Their emergence demands 
reexamination of the traditionally held assumptions that defined original registration 
laws as civil regulations. 
 
Two intertwined causes are responsible for the schemes’ constitutional downfall. The 
first is a legislative body eager to draft increasingly harsh registration and notification 
schemes to please an electorate that subsists on a steady diet of fear. When combined 
with the second cause, a Supreme Court that has yet to signal much-needed boundaries, 
the ensuing consequence is runaway legislation that is no longer rationally connected to 
its regulatory purpose. Ultimately, this Article is a cautionary tale of legislation that has 
become unmoored from its constitutional grounding because of its punitive effect and 
excessive reach. 
 
 * Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School. The authors wish to thank Dean Bryant Garth 
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are also grateful for the valuable feedback we received from Professor Alexandra D’Italia and for the 
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Excess: action that goes beyond a reasonable amount. 
—Webster’s New World Dictionary and Thesaurus1 
Introduction 
More is not always better. Consider sex offender registration laws. 
Initially anchored by rational basis, registration schemes have spiraled 
out of control because legislators, eager to please a fearful public, have 
been given unfettered freedom by a deferential judiciary. It has been a 
perfect storm of intersecting legislative action and judicial inaction that 
has produced ever-escalating registration burdens. Set against this 
backdrop, a new breed of law has emerged—what this Article terms 
super-registration schemes—resulting from unchecked legislative action 
spurred on by emotionally charged rhetoric. 
If sex offender registration laws originally were designed to protect 
the children of a community,2 then according to prevailing political 
thought, harsher sex offender laws surely must protect children more 
effectively. Unfortunately, that philosophy is neither accurate nor 
constitutional: inaccurate for its reliance on unproven recidivism 
statistics3 and false claims of security,4 and unconstitutional for its 
 
 1. Webster’s New World Dictionary and Thesaurus 214 (1996). 
 2. See infra notes 21–31 and accompanying text. 
 3. Some have criticized the blind adoption of statistics claiming that sex offenders recidivate at a 
higher rate than do other types of offenders. See, e.g., Catherine L. Carpenter, Legislative Epidemics: 
A Cautionary Tale of Criminal Laws That Have Swept the Country, 58 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 57–58 (2010) 
(referencing Department of Justice statistics to rebut the claim that sex offenders recidivate at higher 
rates); Wayne A. Logan, Megan’s Laws as a Case Study in Political Stasis, 61 Syracuse L. Rev. 371, 
393–94 (2011) (explaining the various sociological and political factors that may account for the claim 
of recidivism); Doron Teichman, Sex, Shame and the Law: An Economic Perspective on Megan’s Laws, 
42 Harv. J. on Legis. 355, 382–83 (2005) (arguing that interpreting recidivism data is more complex 
than generally acknowledged); Jane A. Small, Note, Who Are the People in Your Neighborhood? Due 
Process, Public Protection, and Sex Offender Notification Laws, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1451, 1457 (1999) 
(identifying the flaws in adjudging recidivism rates of sex offenders). 
 4. A study commissioned by the Texas Senate Committee on Criminal Justice in 2010 concluded 
that “[b]ased on the research [and] the testimony provided during the hearing, it is clear registries do 
not provide the public safety, definitely not the way it is now.” S. Comm. on Crim. Justice, Interim 
Report to 82nd Leg., S. Rep. No. 81, at 4 (Tex. 2010), available at http://www.senate.state.tx.us/ 
75r/senate/commit/c590/c590.InterimReport81.pdf. One need only review the tragic circumstance 
surrounding the capture and seventeen-year imprisonment of Jaycee Dugard by convicted sex 
offender Philip Garrido to appreciate that sex offender registration laws at most aid in the 
apprehension of suspects, but do little to protect children. See Marisol Bello, Questions Arise on 
Monitoring of Sex Offenders, USA Today, Sept. 2, 2009, at A3 (observing ironically that Phillip 
Garrido was able to keep Jaycee Dugard captive for so long despite the fact that “[e]very April 5 for 
the past 10 years, Phillip Garrido registered on his birthday . . . as a convicted sex offender”); Maura 
Dolan, Federal Parole Officials Released Phillip Garrido from 50-year Sentence After Short Interview, 
L.A. Times, Sept. 5, 2009, at A9 (reporting that Phillip Garrido was on parole and subject to regular 
inspections and visits by his parole officers during the time that Jaycee Dugard remained his captive); 
see also Michele L. Earl-Hubbard, The Child Sex Offender Registration Laws: The Punishment, Liberty 
Deprivation, and Unintended Results Associated with the Scarlet Letter Laws of the 1990s, 90 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 788, 853–54 (1996) (arguing that notification laws create a false sense of security in the 
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excessive and punitive effect. Like “piling on” penalties in football that 
can nullify clean tackles,5 serially amended sex offender registration 
schemes are faltering under their own weight and ambition.6 
This Article posits that two intertwined causes are responsible for 
these schemes’ constitutional downfall. The first is a legislative body 
eager to draft increasingly harsh registration and notification schemes to 
please an electorate that subsists on a steady diet of fear. When 
combined with the second cause, a Supreme Court that has yet to signal 
much-needed boundaries, the ensuing consequence is runaway 
legislation that has become unmoored from its initial constitutional 
grounding. 
Despite significant changes to registration schemes over the past 
several years, courts and legislative bodies continue to rely on two 
Supreme Court opinions from the 2003 term to define the parameters of 
constitutionality in sex offender registration laws. In Smith v. Doe, the 
Court grappled with whether registration schemes violated ex post facto 
principles by requiring retroactive application to offenders convicted 
prior to the enactment of the laws.7 And in Connecticut Department of 
Public Safety v. Doe, the Court addressed whether procedural due 
process demands that we afford convicted sex offenders the opportunity 
to be heard as to the level of danger they pose before their information is 
disseminated to the community.8 
In both cases, the Court upheld, albeit on different bases, the 
constitutionality of sex offender registration schemes as civil regulations, 
leaving them unencumbered by the substantive and procedural 
requirements traditionally associated with criminal laws. Smith held that 
because sex offender registration laws are regulatory in nature, the 
constitutional ex post facto principle is inapplicable,9 while Connecticut 
Department of Public Safety determined that procedural due process did 
 
community because of the inherent voluntariness of the system). 
 5. See James Alder, About Football Glossary—Piling On, About.com, http://football.about.com/ 
cs/football101/g/gl_pilingon.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2012) (“An illegal play where several players 
jump on the player with the ball after he's been tackled.”). 
 6. Several recent state court decisions have declared super-registration schemes unconstitutional 
because of their excessive and overinclusive nature. See Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind. 2009) 
(concluding that Indiana’s amended scheme violates constitutional principles); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 
4, 26 (Me. 2009) (concluding that the state’s new registration scheme violates ex post facto principles); 
State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1113 (Ohio 2011) (ruling that sections of the state’s sex offender laws 
unconstitutionally increase the punishment for crimes committed before the law took effect). Apart from 
the potential constitutional infirmities, the new sex offender registration schemes come with an exorbitant 
pricetag and are proving very difficult to enact and enforce. See Emanuella Grinberg, 5 Years Later, States 
Struggle to Comply with Federal Sex Offender Law, CNN.com (July 28, 2011, 11:51 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/CRIME/07/28/sex.offender.adam.walsh.act/index.html?hpt=hp_c2. 
 7. 538 U.S. 84, 89 (2003). 
 8. 538 U.S. 1, 1 (2003). 
 9. 538 U.S. at 105. 
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not require individualized assessment for the dissemination of 
registrants’ information to the community.10 Together, the decisions 
impart a striking message: Sex offender registration laws will be allowed 
to flourish as valid regulatory measures despite their intrusive impact. 
It is only human nature—indeed it is the best of political nature—
that left unchecked, drafters will test constitutional boundaries with ever-
broadening legislation.11 It is not surprising, then, that these interrelated 
decisions gave politicians an implicit “green light” to ramp up 
registration and notification requirements. Even the Court’s decisions in 
Carr v. United States12 and Reynolds v. United States13 will do little to 
dampen this message. Although Carr limited the reach of the Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification Act’s (“SORNA”) “failure to 
register” law14 to offenders who traveled interstate after SORNA’s 
enactment,15 and Reynolds defined the role of the Attorney General to 
specify which pre-Act offenders must comply with SORNA,16 neither 
case addressed whether SORNA is punitive in nature or in effect. 
Instead, both decisions framed the inquiry into SORNA around narrow 
questions of congressional intent.17 Parsing language to determine the 
reach of “failure to register”18 and to define the authority of the Attorney 
General to implement SORNA19 enabled the Court to avoid the 
fundamental question of whether ex post facto principles are violated by 
the arguably punitive nature of registration schemes. Therefore, even 
 
 10. 538 U.S at 8 (“States are not barred by principles of ‘procedural due process’ from drawing 
such classifications.” (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 120 (1989) (plurality opinion))). 
 11. An interesting example of swelling unchecked legislation can be found in the number of strict 
liability offenses, which has grown considerably since such offenses were first codified in the mid-
nineteenth century. See Eric A. Degroff, The Application of Strict Criminal Liability to Maritime Oil 
Pollution Incidents: Is There OPA for the Accidental Spiller?, 50 Loy. L. Rev. 827, 841–843 (2004) 
(tracing the significant expansion of strict liability offenses). Only recently did the Supreme Court 
squash the proliferation. See John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Not Guilty by Reason of Blamelessness: 
Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1021, 1022–23 (1999) (examining recent 
decisions to conclude that the Court has reinvoked the importance of moral culpability, and therefore 
mens rea, as a necessary component of a conviction). 
 12. 130 S. Ct. 2229 (2010). 
 13. 132 S. Ct. 975 (2012). 
 14. Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 141(a)(1), 120 Stat. 587, 601–04 (2006) (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2010)). Some states have adopted the “SORNA” acronym for their registration and 
notification statutes. As the Court explained in Carr, § 2250 subjects to criminal penalties “any person 
who (1) ‘is required to register under [SORNA]’, (2) ‘travels in interstate or foreign commerce,’ and 
(3) ‘knowingly fails to register or update a registration.’” 130 S. Ct. at 2232. 
 15. 130 S. Ct. at 2241. 
 16. 132 S. Ct at 978. 
 17. Reynolds, 132 S. Ct. at 980 (exploring whether SORNA applies to pre-Act offenders before 
the Attorney General so determines); Carr, 130 S. Ct. at 2241 (examining whether the failure-to-
register criminal penalties applied to offenders whose interstate travel occurred prior to SORNA’s 
enactment). 
 18. Carr, 130 S. Ct. at 2234–37. 
 19. Reynolds, 132 S. Ct. at 980–82. 
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taking into account the contribution of Carr and Reynolds to the 
discussion, a natural outgrowth of the Court’s jurisprudence is what we 
have today: a second generation of sex offender statutes more 
burdensome and stigmatizing than its parent. 
Part I of this Article examines the current state of sex offender 
legislation. It traces the growth of sex offender registration laws and 
community notification statutes after Smith v. Doe and Connecticut 
Department of Public Safety. Expansion includes more significant 
affirmative reporting obligations, a corresponding increase in the level 
and intensity of community notification, and, most important, the 
systematic elimination of individualized risk assessment. Part II reviews 
the case law and theories that guide a court’s determination as to whether 
a law is a civil regulation or a criminal statute cloaked in civil rhetoric. Part 
II further explains the consequences of such determinations. 
The balance of the Article explores the pervasive theme of 
excessiveness and its impact on the constitutionality of super-registration 
schemes. Part III analyzes today’s sex offender schemes under ex post 
facto principles to determine whether the assumptions that controlled in 
Smith v. Doe continue to have vitality. This Part concludes that new 
assumptions dominate super-registration schemes, which recast these 
schemes as criminal penalties cloaked in civil disguise. Part IV makes the 
case that excessive legislation results in both substantive and procedural 
due process violations because registrants have been deprived of 
profound liberty interests under this generation of registration laws. 
If one observation can be made, it is this: Judicial deference to 
legislative authority is no longer an appropriate response to ever-
harshening registration schemes. Despite the disapproval and fear that 
sex offenders generate in the community, the judiciary’s role must be to 
support and preserve foundational constitutional principles “without 
respect to persons.”20 Without judicial intervention to set boundaries, 
legislators will continue to respond to the community’s collective fear 
with expanding laws that punish the sex offender. That is why Part V, 
entitled “Enough is Enough,” heralds three state supreme courts that 
have filled the judicial silence with eloquent opinions that recognize the 
punitive nature of these serially amended schemes. 
I.  A Race to the Harshest: A Snapshot of the New Generation of 
Sex Offender Registration Laws 
Separate incidents involving three young children—Adam,21 Jacob,22 
and Megan23—each of whom was abducted and murdered, coalesced in a 
 
 20. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2010) (“Oaths of Justices and Judges”). 
 21. Six-year-old Adam Walsh was abducted and murdered in 1981. The Adam Walsh Story, Nat’l 
Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children, http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/ 
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national conversation on crimes against children.24 The accounts are well 
known, but they are still heartbreaking to hear. Spearheaded by grieving 
families,25 the conversation transformed into political action and resulted 
in a myriad of legislation including the passage of the Jacob Wetterling 
Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration 
Act (“SORA”).26 The Act required each of the fifty states to adopt sex 
offender registration laws within three years of the Act’s passage in order 
to receive federal law enforcement funding.27 The first generation of sex 
offender laws passed in response to SORA “was designed as a tool solely 
for law enforcement agencies, and registry records were kept 
confidential.”28 In 1996, under its famous moniker “Megan’s Law,” 
Congress amended the Jacob Wetterling Act to include the 
dissemination of registration information to the community through 
community notification statutes.29 
 
PageServlet?PageId=1156 (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). Adam’s father, John Walsh, established the 
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children in response to Adam’s death. About John Walsh, 
America’s Most Wanted, http://www.amw.com/about_amw/john_walsh.cfm (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). 
 22. Eleven-year-old Jacob Wetterling was abducted at gunpoint in front of his friends in 1989 and 
was never found. How We Began and the Need for Transition, Jacob Wetterling Resource Ctr., 
http://www.jwrc.org/WhoWeAre/History/tabid/128/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). 
 23. Seven-year-old Megan Kanka was sexually assaulted and murdered in 1994 by Jesse 
Timmendequas, a neighbor who, unbeknownst to Megan’s family, had prior convictions for sexual 
assault against children. State v. Timmendequas, 737 A.2d 55, 66–73 (N.J. 1999).  
 24. See, e.g., Manuel Mendoza, Nation Responds to Adam Re-Airing, Miami News, May 1, 1984, 
at 5A (reporting the flood of tips on missing children after the airing of Adam Walsh’s disappearance); 
Bud Newman, Missing Children Center Like a Dream for Walsh, Palm Beach Post, Apr. 19, 1984, at 
A2 (announcing the opening of the National Center on Missing and Exploited Children); see also 
Steve Irsay, The Search for Jacob, CNN.com (Nov. 26, 2002, 7:25 PM), http://archives.cnn.com/ 
2002/LAW/11/19/ctv.wetterling/index.html (recounting theories on the abduction Jacob Wetterling). 
 25. For an account of the contribution each family made to the passage of registration and 
notification laws, see Carpenter, supra note 3, at 19–21. 
 26. See Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 170101, 108 Stat. 1796, 2038 (1994) (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006)) (repealed 2006) (establishing federal guidelines for state sex offender 
registration laws). Some states have adopted the “SORA” acronym for their registration and 
notification statutes. 
 27. Id. § 170101(g). States that did not comply were faced with a decrease in federal funding. See 
id. Although congressional action provided the final push for nationwide sex offender legislation, 
there were a few states that passed sex offender registration laws much earlier. See Abril R. Bedarf, 
Comment, Examining Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 83 Calif. L. Rev. 885, 887 n.4 
(1995) (noting that the first states to introduce sex offender registration laws were Alabama, Arizona, 
California, Illinois, and Nevada, all between 1947 and 1967). 
 28. Doe v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 495 (6th Cir. 2007) (relating the history of 
SORA). 
 29. Pub. L. No. 104-145, § 2, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14071 
(2010)). The act provided that the designated state law enforcement agency “shall release relevant 
information that is necessary to protect the public concerning a specific person required to register 
under this section.” Id. So strong was the public’s reaction to the Kankas’ call for reform, that New 
Jersey passed the first Megan’s Law just three months after Megan’s murder. See E.B. v. Verniero, 
119 F.3d 1077, 1081–82 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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However, SORA was only the beginning. In 2006, Congress passed 
the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act (“AWA”).30 
Encompassed in the AWA is SORNA,31 which includes a set of 
regulations, penalties, and punishments for sex offenders, and a 
comprehensive national system for their registration.32 
Passage of SORNA redefined the landscape. The ensuing years 
have been marked by a dizzying array of increased registration and 
community notification requirements, the emergence of harshening 
residency restrictions, and the elimination of individuated risk 
assessment.33 Although jurists and scholars alike decried aspects of the 
original sex offender registration schemes,34 in retrospect, those laws 
were tame by comparison to SORNA and its progeny.35 
 
 30. Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 
42 U.S.C. (2010)). The Act has been the subject of considerable scholarly criticism. See, e.g., Steven J. 
Costigliacci, Protecting Our Children from Sex Offenders: Have We Gone Too Far?, 46 Fam. Ct. Rev. 
180, 183–84 (2008) (criticizing the lack of flexibility in determining registrants’ status under the AWA); 
David A. Singleton, Sex Offender Residency Statutes and the Culture of Fear: The Case for More 
Meaningful Rational Basis Review of Fear-Driven Public Safety Laws, 3 U. St. Thomas L.J. 600, 628 
(2006) (arguing that residency restrictions have not been proven effective); Brittany Enniss, Note, 
Quickly Assuaging Public Fear: How the Well-Intended Adam Walsh Act Led to Unintended 
Consequences, 2008 Utah L. Rev. 697, 706–08 (noting that the AWA, enacted to protect minors, has 
harmed juvenile offenders who have been subject to its provisions); Emily A. White, Note, 
Prosecutions Under the Adam Walsh Act: Is America Keeping Its Promise?, 65 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 
1783, 1792–93 nn.64–66 (2008) (noting a split among district courts regarding the retroactive 
applicability of provisions of the AWA).  
 31. Pub. L. No. 109-248, tit. I, 120 Stat. 590 (2006) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–
16929 (2010)). SORNA established “the Jacob Wetterling, Megan Nicole Kanka, and Pam Lychner 
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Program,” immortalizing three of the most notable victims 
of sex offenders. See 42 U.S.C. § 16902 (2010). 
 32. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 16911–16929 (2010). A brief overview of SORNA’s most basic requirements 
should paint a sufficient picture of the regulations put into effect. SORNA requires every sex offender 
to register in the jurisdictions where the offender lives, works, and goes to school. Id. § 16913(a). 
Registration includes the provision of specified information to law enforcement, which will be 
included in the jurisdiction’s sex offender registry, for a period of fifteen years to life depending on the 
level of the offender. Id. §§ 16914(a), 16915(a). The Act authorizes the Attorney General to collect 
certain Internet-related information, as determined by the Attorney General, to be included in a 
federal registry. See id. §§ 16914(a)(7), 16915(a). SORNA also requires that every jurisdiction provide 
for a criminal penalty that includes a maximum term of imprisonment that is greater than one year for 
a failure to comply with the registration requirements espoused in the Act. Id. § 16913(e). SORNA 
requires each jurisdiction to make the registry information available to the public on the Internet. Id. 
§ 16918. The Act also established a national sex offender registry, which is accessible by the public via 
a website. Id. §§ 16919–16920. 
 33. Courts have acknowledged the substantial changes to sex offender registration schemes. See, 
e.g., Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 374–77 (Ind. 2009) (recounting the numerous changes to the 
federal and Indiana sex offender registration schemes); see also State v. Henry, 228 P.3d 900, 903–05 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (providing a detailed history of amendments to Arizona’s offender schemes); 
State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 8–11 (Me. 2009) (detailing the extensive amendments to Maine’s 
registration scheme); Doe v. Nebraska, 734 F. Supp. 2d 882, 894 (D. Neb. 2010) (discussing the impact 
of two 2009 amendments to Nebraska’s sex offender registration laws); State v. Bodyke, 933 N.E.2d 
753, 757–60 (Ohio 2010) (detailing the amendments to Ohio’s sex offender registration scheme). 
 34. For examples of judicial criticism, see Doe v. Pryor, 61 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1226 (M.D. Ala. 
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The revised registration schemes include an ever-increasing number 
of registerable offenses, lengthening durational requirements, expanded 
personal information reporting requirements, harsher residency 
restrictions, the introduction of the GPS tracking device, and the 
systematic elimination of individualized assessment as a touchstone.36 
One embodiment of the super-registration scheme is California’s 
Jessica’s Law,37 the highly trumpeted ballot measure that was passed by 
California voters in 2006.38 Acknowledged on both the ballot measure39 
and in subsequent case law as the toughest in the country,40 Jessica’s Law 
expanded the list of registerable offenses and made more stringent 
reporting requirements and notification procedures.41 
 
1999) (characterizing Alabama’s registration scheme as “among the . . . most restrictive of such laws in 
the nation”); Doe v. Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“[T]he registration provisions of 
the Act place a ‘tangible burden’ on plaintiffs, potentially for the rest of their lives.”); Doe v. Dep’t of 
Pub. Safety, 92 P.3d 398, 409–10 (Alaska 2004) (reiterating the burdensome nature of Alaska’s 
registration requirements); State v. Robinson, 873 So. 2d 1205, 1213 (Fla. 2004) (recognizing that 
Florida’s statute “imposes more than a stigma,” subjecting designated sexual predators to “life-long 
registration requirements”); State v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1041 (Kan. 1996) (“The practical effect of 
such unrestricted dissemination could make it impossible for the offender to find housing or 
employment.”). For scholarly criticism, see, for example, Bedarf, supra note 27, at 939; Earl-Hubbard, 
supra note 4, at 826 (“Although the registration laws have a regulatory purpose, the laws cause 
offenders to suffer a disability that is so punitive as to negate this regulatory intent.”); Wayne A. 
Logan, A Study in “Actuarial Justice”: Sex Offender Classification Practice and Procedure, 3 Buff. 
Crim. L. Rev. 593, 593–95 (2000) (disputing the assumption that sex offenders recidivate at higher 
rates); see also Catherine L. Carpenter, The Constitutionality of Strict Liability in Sex Offender 
Registration Laws, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 295, 299 (2006) (challenging the inclusion of strict liability sex 
offenses in registration schemes). 
 35. See Corey Rayburn Yung, One of These Laws Is Not Like the Others: Why the Federal Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification Act Raises New Constitutional Questions, 46 Harv. J. on Legis. 
369, 370–71 (2009) (contending that SORNA’s provisions must be amended to meet constitutional 
muster). 
 36. See infra Part I. 
 37. Jessica’s Law is named in memory of nine-year-old Jessica Lunsford, who was raped and 
murdered by John Couey, a convicted sex offender. See Terry Aguayo, Sex Offender Guilty of Rape 
and Murder of Florida Girl, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 2007, at A15. 
 38. See Sexual Predator Punishment and Control Act: Jessica’s Law, Prop. 83, § 22, 2006 Cal. 
Legis. Serv. 2155 (West) (codified as amended in scattered sections of Cal. Penal Code).  
 39. Id.  
 40. See, e.g., People v. Mosley, 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 321, 332 (Ct. App. 2010) (listing the “dozens of 
changes to the laws” concerning the registration and notification schemes). 
 41. Id. The passage of Jessica’s Law sparked controversy and invoked scrutiny. Shortly after the 
law was approved by California voters, a federal judge issued a temporary injunction against the 
retroactive enforcement of the law’s residency restrictions. Jenifer Warren, Judge Blocks Part of Sex 
Offender Law, L.A. Times, Nov. 9, 2006, at A32. The law’s sponsors, however, did not intend for those 
restrictions to apply retroactively. See id.; see also Bill Ainsworth, Law Creates Homeless Parolees, 
Report Says—Sex Offenders Limited by Residency Rules, San Diego Union-Tribune, Feb. 22, 2008, at 
A1 (observing that residency restrictions imposed by Jessica’s Law have caused many sex offenders in 
California to become homeless). Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court ruled that the residency 
restrictions can be applied retroactively to offenders who committed their crimes before the law 
passed but were paroled after it took effect. In re E.J., 223 P.3d 31, 38–40 (Cal. 2010). 
Carpenter_24 (J. Grantz) (Do Not Delete) 4/19/2012 6:23 PM 
1080 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:1071 
Registration schemes like Jessica’s Law have been propelled into 
passage by the public’s fear of the stereotypic image of the sex 
offender—the violent pedophile on the lookout for small children.42 
Unfortunately, that singular perception ignores the reality that sex 
offender statutes stigmatize wide-ranging actions and apply to broad 
segments of the population. Although the cast of characters may change, 
countless cases relay stories of offenders, no longer dangerous, struggling 
to maintain stability in lives governed by ever-evolving and increasingly 
stringent legislation. 
The face of registration includes Dean Edgar Weisart, who was 
convicted of indecent exposure for skinny-dipping with his girlfriend in a 
hotel pool in 1979 and then required to register more than twenty years 
later.43 It contemplates offenders such as Ricky Blackmun, whose family 
moved to Oklahoma from Iowa for a fresh start after Ricky was 
convicted as an adult sex offender for having sex with a thirteen-year-old 
girl when he was sixteen.44 Even though Ricky’s record was expunged in 
Iowa, he was required to register as a tier III sex offender—the highest 
level—in Oklahoma until a change in the law terminated his duty to 
register.45 Registration rolls are also populated by children—adjudicated 
juvenile offenders who, despite their ages, face the same burdensome 
registration requirements for certain offenses as do convicted adults.46 
The face of registration also comprises offenders displaced from 
their homes because of onerous residency restrictions.47 In New York, a 
seventy-seven-year-old convicted offender living in Manhattan was 
banished from his residence of some forty years because of amended 
New York residency restrictions.48 In South Florida, numerous convicted 
offenders live under the Julia Tuttle Causeway, a large bridge, because 
there is no community in South Florida where they may reside without 
violating residency restrictions.49 In Georgia, Anthony Mann, a registered 
 
 42. This image is seared into everyone’s minds because of the tragic death of Megan Kanka, who 
was killed by a violent pedophile. See supra notes 22–23. 
 43. See Wiesart v. Stewart, 665 S.E.2d 187, 187–88 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008); see also State v. Chun, 76 
P.3d 935, 935–36, 942 (Haw. 2003) (concluding that the offense of Llewelyn Chun, a husband and 
father who pled no contest to indecent exposure and was required to register, was not registration-
worthy because it did not entail “criminal sexual conduct”). 
 44. Emanuella Grinberg, No Longer a Registered Sex Offender, but the Stigma Remains, 
CNN.com (Feb. 11, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-02-11/justice/oklahoma.teen.sex.offender_1_ 
offender-registry-oklahoma-label. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See, e.g., Helman v. State, 784 A.2d 1058 (Del. 2001) (holding that registration and community 
notification requirements are constitutional as applied to juveniles); In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d 747 (Ill. 
2003) (affirming lifetime registration for an adjudicated juvenile offender); In re Welfare of J.R.Z, 
648 N.W.2d 241, 247–48 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding lifetime registration for an eleven-year-old). 
 47. For a description of the changes in residency restrictions, see infra Part I.D. 
 48. Berlin v. Evans, 923 N.Y.S.2d 828, 828 (Sup. Ct. 2011). 
 49. Catharine Skipp & Arian Campo-Flores, A Bridge Too Far, Newsweek, Aug. 3, 2009, at 46; 
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sex offender, was prohibited from entering the restaurant he half owned 
and ran because child-care facilities located themselves within 1000 feet 
of Mann’s business.50 
These are the casualties of a system that at the outset was intended 
to protect the public from dangerous offenders but that has evolved into 
the politically motivated pursuit of harsher laws designed to satisfy a 
fearful public.51 Unfortunately, in that pursuit, these laws have become 
excessively punitive and, consequently, are no longer rationally connected 
to their regulatory purpose.52 
A. Growing Number of Registerable Offenses 
Since the 1990s, registration-worthy sex offenses have grown 
dramatically in number and scope. For example, in 1994, when the 
Indiana General Assembly adopted Zachary’s Law, the state’s first 
registration scheme (named in honor of ten-year-old Zachary Snider, 
who was molested and murdered by a convicted molester),53 a mere eight 
crimes triggered registration.54 Currently, Zachary’s Law lists forty 
offenses that trigger registration: twenty-one offenses trigger registration 
as a “sex or violent offender”55 and an additional nineteen offenses 
 
see Catharine Skipp, A Law for the Sex Offenders Under a Miami Bridge, Time (Feb. 1, 2010), 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1957778,00.html. 
 50. Mann v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 653 S.E.2d 740, 742 (Ga. 2007) (finding Georgia’s residency 
restrictions unconstitutional only insofar as they permitted the regulatory taking of the defendant’s 
home without just compensation). 
 51. Much has been written on the public’s fear and commensurate desire for harsher 
punishments. See Wayne A. Logan, Knowledge as Power: Criminal Registration and Community 
Notification Laws in America 85–108 (2009) (exploring the social and political catalysts for the 
proliferation of registration schemes); Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got to Do with It? The Political, 
Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal 
Law, 1 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 23 (1997) (examining the reasons why the public favors harsh punishments 
in the face of countervailing evidence); Singleton, supra note 30, at 602–07 (arguing that an increase in 
crime reporting in the media induced the proliferation of sex offender registration laws); see also 
William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 781, 781 (2006) 
(contending that the harsh justice of the 1970s was a response to the “constitutional proceduralism” of 
the 1960s). 
 52. See Carpenter, supra note 3, at 51–55 (arguing that the increasing harshness of registration 
schemes is tied to a political desire to push offenders from their communities before adjoining 
communities do the same). Although the legislative intent behind registration schemes is often 
characterized as remedial in nature, the emotional charge prompting the legislation sometimes is not. 
See, e.g., Doe v. Nebraska, 734 F. Supp. 2d 882 (D. Neb. 2010) (acknowledging that the sponsoring 
legislator expressed rage and revulsion toward convicted offenders). 
 53. See Overview of Zachary’s Law, Allen County Sheriff (Jan. 5, 2011), 
http://www.allencountysheriff.org/sexoffender/zachary.html (providing the background of the passage 
of Zachary’s Law). For a review of the rise of personalized legislation and specifically naming 
legislation in honor of children victims, see Carpenter, supra note 3, at 23–34 (suggesting that the 
names are an effective marketing technique based on their simplicity and emotional power). 
 54. See Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 375 (Ind. 2009) (detailing the historical development of 
registerable offenses in Indiana); see also State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 8–11 (Me. 2009). 
 55. Ind. Code § 11-8-8-5, -7 (2011), invalidated by Wallace, 905 N.E.2d 371. 
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trigger registration as a “sex offender.”56 Other states have similar 
trajectories, with some registration schemes adding as many as forty 
registration-worthy offenses to their initial legislation.57 
In addition, some states have introduced “discretionary registration,” 
which permits courts to require registration where mandatory 
registration is otherwise not required58 or not allowed.59 In People v. 
Picklesimer, for example, the State conceded that the defendant’s oral 
copulation with a seventeen-year-old girl was “voluntary,” and that his 
conviction therefore could not support mandatory registration under 
existing California law.60 However, the State successfully argued that the 
defendant’s conviction supported the trial court’s decision to impose 
discretionary lifetime registration under California’s sex offender 
statute.61 Indeed, the watchword appears to be “discretionary,” as 
legislative enactments specifically rest discretion as to a number of legal 
points with one of the federal or state government branches.62 
Commensurate with the increase in the number of offenses is their 
shifting classification. To be sure, reclassification is not merely a case of 
semantics. When a crime is reclassified as more dangerous, so, too, is the 
 
 56. Ind. Code § 11-8-8-4.5, invalidated by Wallace, 905 N.E.2d 371. 
 57. See, e.g., Letalien, 985 A.2d at 8 (discussing Maine’s first registration scheme, which limited 
the class of registrants to only those persons who had been convicted of gross sexual assault involving 
a victim who was under sixteen years of age at the time of the commission of the crime). Compare 
Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 1247 n.1 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting that Utah’s registration scheme at 
that time listed nineteen triggering offenses), with Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-21.5(g), (n) (2011) (listing 
twenty-nine registerable offenses); see also La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:541(24)(a) (2011) (listing twenty-
six offenses that qualify as sexual offenses, including voyeurism and video voyeurism); N.Y. Correct. 
Law § 168-a (2011) (cataloguing over forty registerable offenses in New York). 
 58. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 290.006 (2011) (providing for discretionary registration where 
“the court finds at the time of conviction or sentencing that the person committed the offense as a 
result of sexual compulsion or for purposes of sexual gratification”); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 15:544(E)(1) (2011) (permitting a court to impose lifetime registration after a contradictory hearing); 
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:544(E)(1) (stating that the district attorney and the offender may enter into a 
plea agreement whereby the offender will be subject to lifetime registration without a contradictory 
hearing). 
 59. See, e.g., People v. Picklesimer, 226 P.3d 348, 357 (Cal. 2010) (explaining that mandatory 
registration for those convicted of oral copulation with a minor is unconstitutional under California 
case law, but that discretionary registration is not). 
 60. Id. at 356 (citing People v. Hofsheier, 129 P.3d 29 (Cal. 2006)). 
 61. Id. at 357. The California Supreme Court determined that there was “no constitutional bar to 
having a judge exercise his or her discretion to determine whether [one convicted of a crime] should 
continue to be subject to registration.” Id. at 358; see United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1352–53 
(11th Cir. 2010) (reasoning that because of the expansive language used in SORNA, the Act allows the 
imposition of registration requirements for offenses not specifically enumerated). 
 62. See United States v. Juvenile Male, 590 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 2009) (describing Congress’s 
delegation to the Attorney General of the power to determine whether SORNA applied retroactively 
and, if so, whether it applied retroactively to juveniles); State v. Bodyke, 933 N.E.2d 753, 759–60 (Ohio 
2010) (criticizing Ohio’s statutory scheme, which authorized the attorney general alone to reclassify 
offenders already classified by the court); see also Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.550(1) (2011) (affording 
discretion to public agencies to determine “relevant and necessary” release of information). 
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individual convicted of that crime.63 Upward reclassification increases 
registration and notification burdens, and reclassification affects both 
future offenders and those previously convicted and classified as less 
dangerous.64 Consequently, burdens associated with the reclassification 
are being applied retroactively to convicted offenders who were deemed 
a lower risk under previous registration schemes.65 Although it is within 
legislative purview to alter or expand legislation,66 in the absence of 
scientific evidence or other proof to explain the reclassification, the shift 
can be viewed as simply another example of legislative hunger in action. 
Particularly disconcerting is the fact that revised classifications are 
often made without individualized assessment of the convicted offender’s 
level of dangerousness.67 And even when a reclassification hearing is 
statutorily authorized, it does not ensure procedural due process because 
often the hearing is not held,68 or if it is held, it is administered in a 
cursory fashion that calls into question the hearing’s legitimacy.69 
Under Ohio’s prevailing registration scheme, for example, a 
previously convicted offender’s level of dangerousness could be 
reclassified upward solely upon the legislature’s decision to reclassify the 
crime; it could not be based on a judicial determination of the 
dangerousness of the offender or upon a finding that the offense itself 
was of particular danger.70 So troubling was this apparent usurpation of 
 
 63. See, e.g., Lemmon v. Harris, 949 N.E.2d 803, 804–05 (Ind. 2011) (stating that the defendant, 
who originally was required to register for ten years, was later notified that his conviction had been 
reclassified to require registration for life); State v. Ortega-Martinez, 2011-Ohio-2540U, ¶¶ 1–2 (Ct. 
App.) (noting that upon reclassification of its registration scheme in Ohio, convicted sex offender 
Ortega-Martinez’s classification changed from lowest level of risk offense to tier II offender with the 
commensurate increase in registration and notification requirements); State v. Poling, 2011-Ohio-3201U, 
¶ 7 (Ct. App.) (registrant’s reporting requirements changed from annual to once every ninety days). 
 64. See, e.g., Jensen v. State, 905 N.E.2d 384, 389 (Ind. 2009) (explaining that the defendant had 
been reclassified from a “sex offender,” who must register for ten years, to a “sexually violent 
predator,” who must register for life). 
 65. See id.; see also Hannah v. State, 2011-Ohio-2930U (Ct. App.) (reviewing the reclassification 
of seven tier I offenders to tier III status); Ortega-Martinez, 2011-Ohio-2540U, ¶¶ 1–2. 
 66. See, e.g., Bodyke, 933 N.E.2d at 766 (acknowledging the Legislature’s authority to enact or 
amend sex offender registration laws). 
 67. For example, reclassification in Ohio is statutorily authorized to be administered by the 
attorney general alone, and therefore occurs without any individualized assessment or expert 
testimony. See id. ¶ 22. 
 68. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 2009-1765U, p. 7 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/26/10) (reporting that although 
the offender was entitled to a “contradictory” hearing to determine his classification, one was never 
held); State v. Germane, 971 A.2d 555, 579 (R.I. 2009) (determining that the inability of the registrant 
to present evidence did not pose “any actual risk of erroneous deprivation of his protected liberty 
interests”). 
 69. See, e.g., Doe v. Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456, 460 (S.D.N.Y 1998) (finding that the offender’s 
classification hearing lasted no more than five minutes, and that the court relied on an improper 
offense to determine the offender’s classification). 
 70. See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2950.031(A)(1)–(2) (West 2011) (articulating the new 
classifications and their applicability to previously convicted offenders), invalidated by Bodyke, 
933 N.E.2d 753. 
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authority that the Ohio Supreme Court determined that such legislative 
action was a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.71 
But it is not just about the expanding number of offenses; it is also 
about their broadening scope. Originally, sexual motivation or purpose 
was a necessary component for an offense to be registerable, as was 
evident from the definitional section of the codes72 and from legislative 
history.73 Today, however, registration schemes include mandatory 
registration for crimes committed against minors, even where there is no 
sexual purpose or contact.74 
Fidelity to the original impetus for sex offender registration would 
suggest that, at a minimum, a registration-worthy offense must include 
underlying sexual predatory behavior or intent.75 And to some extent, 
that initially was the practice. Courts would find a violation of due 
process when, on occasion, a state legislature had crossed the bounds to 
require automatic registration without proof of sexual motivation.76 For 
 
 71. See Bodyke, 933 N.E.2d at 766 (“The reclassification scheme in the AWA works to 
‘legislatively vacate[] the settled and final judgments of the judicial branch of government.’ The 
legislative attempt to reopen journalized final judgments imposing registration and community 
notification requirements on offenders so that new requirements may be imposed suffers the same 
constitutional infirmity.” (citations omitted)). Other courts, however, have rejected such claims. See 
Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1349 (11th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the defendant’s claim that Florida’s 
reclassification scheme violated the doctrine of separation of powers). 
 72. See, e.g., State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 8 (Me. 2009) (“[S]ex offender [is defined as] an 
individual convicted of gross sexual assault if the victim had not in fact attained 16 years of age at the 
time of the crime.” (citing Me. Rev. Stat. tit 34-A, § 11103(5) (1996))); see also People v. Logan, 705 
N.E.2d 152, 156 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (“The category of sex offenders includes any person who is 
convicted of a sex offense or who is certified as a sexually dangerous person pursuant to the Sexually 
Dangerous Persons Act . . . .”). 
 73. See, e.g., Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d at 1345 (observing that the State’s purpose in enacting 
Florida’s Sex Offender Act was to protect “the public from sexual abuse”); Lee v. State, 895 So. 2d 
1038, 1042 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (“[T]he legislature found that the public was in danger because of 
the high recidivism rate among such offenders.”); Logan, 705 N.E.2d at 158–59 (explaining the original 
intent of Illinois’ registration law). Sexual purpose was of such fundamental import that, where a plea 
agreement resulted in sexual crimes being dismissed and only nonsexual crimes remaining, the court 
was required to make a “sexual motivation finding” before requiring registration. See, e.g., State v. 
Whalen, 588 S.E.2d 677, 681 (W. Va. 2003). 
 74. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 42-1-12(a)(9)(B)(ii) (2011) (including false imprisonment of a 
minor by anyone other than a parent to be a registerable offense); Ind. Code § 11-8-8-5(11), (12) 
(2011) (requiring registration for kidnapping and criminal confinement of a minor by anyone other 
than a parent or guardian), invalidated by Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 2009).  
 75. See, e.g., E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1097 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[W]e found that the legislative 
purpose of Megan’s Law was to identify potential recidivists and alert the public when necessary for 
the public safety, and to help prevent and promptly resolve incidents involving sexual abuse and 
missing persons.”); Fredenburg v. City of Fremont, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 437, 439 (Ct. App. 2004) (“The 
Legislature further found that the public had a ‘compelling and necessary . . . interest’ in obtaining 
information about released sex offenders so they can ‘adequately protect themselves and their 
children from these persons.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 290.03)). 
 76. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 843 N.E.2d 434, 440 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (“There is no rational 
basis for requiring defendant to register as a sex offender where he has no history of committing sex 
offenses and his offense of aggravated kidnapping was not sexually motivated and had no sexual 
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example, in State v. Robinson, the Florida Supreme Court rejected 
automatic registration for the defendant’s kidnapping of a minor, where 
the defendant stole a vehicle with a sleeping child in the back seat.77 
Faced with what it perceived to be overreaching by the Florida 
legislature, the court stated, “No rational relationship exists between the 
statute’s purpose of protecting the public from known sexual predators 
and Robinson’s designation as one.”78 
But over the past decade, faithfulness to this rationale has faded. 
One observes a perceptible shift as courts defer to legislative attempts to 
sweep nonsexual crimes into the purview of registerable offenses. Early 
jurisprudence focused on support for legislatures’ intent to use these 
schemes to protect minors from sexual predators.79 Courts no longer 
appear wedded to that justification. Today, courts regularly uphold 
legislation that requires registration for crimes that do not involve sexual 
contact or that are committed without sexual purpose or intent.80 
Employing “minor as victim” as a factual predicate for registration 
arguably has created a list of registerable offenses far removed from the 
original legislative purpose of sex offender registration schemes. Rainer 
v. State offers an excellent illustration.81 Deferring to a general legislative 
aim of protecting children, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that 
the statute’s vague wording demanded that one convicted of robbery of a 
minor must register as a sex offender.82 In affirming automatic 
 
purpose.”), rev’d 870 N.E.2d 415 (Ill. 2007); State v. Robinson, 873 So. 2d 1205, 1207 (Fla. 2004) 
(overturning automatic registration for kidnapping a child); People v. Bell, 778 N.Y.S.2d 837, 847 
(App. Div. 2003) (“None of [the defendant’s] actions in kidnapping . . . the child were done for the 
purpose of sexual victimization of the child . . . . [Therefore,] to require [defendant] to register as a ‘sex 
offender’ is completely arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public morals 
or general sexually-charged safety issues.”). 
 77. 873 So. 2d at 1215. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See, e.g., Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1276 (2d Cir. 1997) (observing that SORA was 
established to improve the ability of law enforcement to combat sex crimes); People v. Malchow, 
739 N.E.2d 433, 437 (Ill. 2000) (“[T]he legislature’s intent in requiring registration of sex offenders was 
to create an additional measure of protection for children from the increasing incidence of sexual 
assault and child abuse.”); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d, 367, 373 (N.J. 1995) (recognizing that the 
legislature’s intent in drafting registration laws was to protect women and children from “potential 
molestation, rape, or murder”). 
 80. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 870 N.E.2d 415, 426 (Ill. 2007) (affirming the State’s interest in 
automatic registration of offenders who commit crimes against minors despite lack of sexual 
motivation); State v. Smith, 780 N.W.2d 90, 105–06 (Wis. 2010) (determining that automatic 
registration did not violate equal protection or due process when applied to a defendant who was 
convicted of false imprisonment of a minor that involved no sexual misconduct). For an argument that 
the inclusion of nonsexual offenses in registration schemes violates due process, see Ofer Raban, Be 
They Fish or Not Fish: The Fishy Registration of Nonsexual Offenders, 16 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 497 
(2007). 
 81. 690 S.E.2d 827 (Ga. 2010). 
 82. Id. at 829–30 (concluding that robbery of a minor qualifies as a registerable offense under 
Georgia’s registration law). 
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registration, the court dismissed as irrelevant the fact that defendant’s 
robbery did not involve sexual activity.83 The majority reasoned that 
requiring defendant to register as a sex offender served to “protect[] 
children from those who would harm them.”84 But dissenting Chief 
Justice Hunstein was concerned by the overinclusiveness of such a 
pronouncement, stating that including crimes of this nature “serves 
merely to sweep within its purview those, such as [the appellant], who 
should not be characterized as ‘sexual offenders.’”85 
Two forces are at play when courts uphold automatic registration of 
offenders who did not commit sexually motivated crimes. First is the 
apparent commitment to defer to legislative intent and prerogative,86 and 
second is a clear disinclination to employ an as-applied analysis to due 
process claims.87 Both forces appeared to be operating in State v. Smith, 
when the Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the duty of seventeen-
year-old James Smith to register for falsely imprisoning another 
seventeen-year-old boy to collect a drug debt.88 Despite clear proof that 
defendant was not sexually motivated to commit the crime, the majority 
determined that these facts were not of particular sway since “the 
legislature may well have rationally concluded that child abductions are 
often precursors to sexual offenses.”89 Similarly, in People v. Johnson the 
Supreme Court of Illinois upheld automatic registration in the case of a 
man who kidnapped his granddaughter for financial gain rather than 
sexual motivation, concluding that a generalized belief that kidnapping 
of a minor could lead to sexual abuse of the minor was sufficient to meet 
due process.90 
 
 83. Id. at 829 (“[T]he fact that Rainer’s [robbery] did not involve sexual activity is of no 
consequence.”). 
 84. Id. But see State v. Chun, 76 P.3d 935, 941 (Haw. 2003) (rejecting the government’s argument 
that registration is required “even if the elements of the charged offense do not entail ‘sexual 
conduct’”). 
 85. Rainer, 690 S.E.2d at 831 (Hunstein, P.J., dissenting). Although Presiding Justice Hunstein did 
not sway the majority in Rainer, she did prevail on a different law affecting offenders when she 
authored an opinion finding that Georgia’s residency restrictions violated principles of eminent 
domain for forcing a long-standing resident to move. See Mann v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 653 S.E.2d 740, 
742 (Ga. 2007). 
 86. See Rainer, 690 S.E.2d at 829 (“It is rational to conclude that requiring those who falsely 
imprison minors who are not the child’s parent to register . . . advances the State’s legitimate goal of 
informing the public for purposes of protecting children from those who would harm them.”). 
 87. See State v. Smith, 780 N.W.2d 90, 109–10 (Wis. 2010) (Bradley, J. dissenting) (criticizing the 
majority’s refusal to consider appellant’s as-applied challenge to the requirement to register as a sex 
offender for commission of false imprisonment of a minor). 
 88. Id. at 92–93 (majority opinion). 
 89. Id. at 102. 
 90. 870 N.E.2d 415, 426 (Ill. 2007) (“Our General Assembly . . . recognized that aggravated 
kidnapping can be a precursor to sex offenses against children.”). 
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B. Increased Registration Burdens 
Registration requirements are not inconsequential. As the Supreme 
Court observed in Lawrence v. Texas, even a conviction of a misdemeanor 
sexual offense imposes a stigma that “is not trivial.”91 Indeed, courts 
acknowledge that registration involves significant and intrusive burdens 
that brand the offender.92 Concomitant to the increasing number and 
nature of registration-worthy offenses, registration schemes also have 
expanded the burdens of registration—both in duration and in the 
detailed nature of the personal information required.93 And in many 
states, the increased burdens are unrelated to the risk level of the 
offender.94 
1. Duration 
Under the first generation of sex offender registration laws, states 
employed a variety of classification systems to determine the offender’s 
attendant registration burdens.95 Generally, offenders were required to 
register according to their level of dangerousness; the minimum usually 
was ten years96 and the maximum was lifetime registration.97 Under 
SORNA, offenders are categorized by their convictions and are 
automatically assigned to a tier based on that offense.98 Tier I offenses 
are regarded as the least serious crimes, with each succeeding tier 
consisting of more dangerous offenses.99 Today, a tier I offender 
generally must register for a minimum of fifteen years100 or, often, twenty 
years.101 Additionally, many more crimes today have been assigned 
lifetime registration102 or recast to require lifetime registration.103 
 
 91. 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003). 
 92. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 873 So. 2d 1205, 1213 (Fla. 2004) (recognizing that Florida’s 
statute “imposes more than a stigma,” subjecting designated sexual predators to “life-long registration 
requirements”); State v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1041 (Kan. 1996) (“The practical effect of such 
unrestricted dissemination could make it impossible for the offender to find housing or 
employment.”).  
 93. See infra notes 95–117 and accompanying text. 
 94. See infra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 95. See Carpenter, supra note 34, at 328–31. 
 96. See, e.g., Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 375 (Ind. 2009) (citing Ind. Code § 5-2-12-13 (1995) 
(requiring a ten-year minimum registration period)); Smith v. State, 2009-1765U, p. 4 (La. App. 1 Cir. 
3/26/10) (noting the ten-year minimum registration requirement in effect at the time of the defendant’s 
conviction in 1995). 
 97. See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 11-707(a)(4)(iii) (LexisNexis 2011) (detailing 
registration for life for tier III sex offenders); S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-460 (2011) (requiring registration 
“biannually for life” for certain offenses). 
 98. See 42 U.S.C. § 16911 (2010).  
 99. Id. (defining the offenses that make up tiers II and III, and stating that “[t]he term ‘tier I sex 
offender’ means a sex offender other than a tier II or tier III sex offender”). 
 100. Pollis v. State, 2009-Ohio-5058U, ¶ 58 (Ct. App.) (discussing the change in the registration 
requirement from ten years to fifteen years). 
 101. See, e.g., N.Y. Correct. Law § 168-h(1) (2011) (requiring level one offenders to register 
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2. Additional Personal Information 
All registration schemes require offenders to provide detailed 
personal information. The first incarnation of registration following the 
federal guidelines required that each registrant provide local law 
enforcement with their name, address, photograph, and fingerprints;104 in 
some states, the offender must also supply a biological specimen.105 
Today, sex offenders may also be asked to supply driver’s license 
numbers, dates and places of birth, dates and places of conviction, places 
of employment, passwords to social networking websites, and prior 
crimes.106 Some states also require offenders to provide DNA samples.107 
The changes made to Louisiana’s registration scheme exemplify the 
nationwide trend towards more demanding requirements. In 2001, 
Louisiana’s sex offender statute required a registrant to provide a few 
key pieces of information. An offender would be asked to register “his 
 
annually for twenty years); see also Buck v. Commonwealth, 308 S.W.3d 661, 663 (Ky. 2010) 
(observing that the 2006 amendments to the Kentucky registration scheme increased registration for 
nonlifetime offenses from ten years to twenty years). 
 102. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 290 (2011) (mandating lifetime registration for sodomy; lewd and 
lascivious acts with a minor; oral copulation; forcible acts of sexual penetration; kidnapping; 
kidnapping for ransom, reward, or extortion, or to commit robbery or rape; harmful matter sent with 
intent of seduction of minor; lewd or obscene conduct; indecent exposure; and obscene exhibitions). 
 103. See, e.g., Jensen v. State, 905 N.E.2d 384, 394 (Ind. 2009) (upholding the change from ten-year 
to lifetime registration); see also State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 9–10 (Me. 2009) (discussing the change 
in registration from fifteen-year to lifetime registration following the amendment of Maine’s 
SORNA); McCabe v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 508, 510 (Va. 2007) (reporting the change from ten-
year to lifetime registration); Smith v. State, 2009-1765U, p. 4 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/26/10) (same). 
 104. See Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration 
Act (“SORA”), Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 170101(b)(1)(A)(ii), (iv), 108 Stat. 2038, 2040 (1996) (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006)) (repealed 2006); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-258(a)(1) (2011) 
(stating that information in the registration is a matter of public record and is available for access 
during normal business hours at the local police department); Fla. Stat. § 943.043(3) (2011) 
(explaining that a member of the public can obtain information, including a photograph of the 
offender and a summary of convictions, through a toll-free number); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 846E-3(b) 
(West 2011) (allowing information, such as address, car information, and a picture to be released by 
the county police department); Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 11-717 (LexisNexis 2011) (indicating 
that all registrants’ information shall be available to the public either through the Internet or by 
request); Miss. Code Ann. § 45-33-49(3), (4) (2011) (ordering that “any information deemed 
necessary for the protection of the public,” such as a photograph, place of employment, and crime for 
which the offender was convicted, shall be provided to anyone who requests the information of any 
registrant); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651-B:7(IV) (2011) (declaring that any member of the public may 
request information from the local law enforcement agency regarding the list of registrants including 
their pictures and addresses). 
 105. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 943.325 (2011); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-4907(b) (2011); Miss. Code 
Ann. § 45-33-37 (2011); Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 584 (2011). 
 106. See, e.g., N.Y. Correct. Law § 168-b(1)(a)-(c) (2011) (requiring a sex offender to provide his 
name, alias, date of birth, sex, race, height, weight, eye color, driver's license number, home address, 
description of the offense, date of conviction, sentence imposed, photograph, and fingerprints); Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-27-21.5 (2011); Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.130 (2011). 
 107. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 36-18-25 (2011); Cal. Penal Code § 296.2(c) (2011); La. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 15:542(C)(1) (2011). 
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name, address, and place of employment; the crime for which he was 
convicted; the date and place of such conviction; any aliases used by the 
person; and the person’s social security number.”108 Today, Louisiana’s 
Megan’s Law includes one of the most detailed and extensive lists of 
required information, including palm prints, a DNA sample, and all 
landline and mobile telephone numbers.109 Additionally, the risk level of 
the offender is not relevant to the level of detail required: sex offenders 
and child predators alike are asked to provide the same information 
under Louisiana’s Megan’s Law.110 
Because computers are now an integral part of daily life, many sex 
offender statutes have been amended to restrict or remove freedoms and 
activities associated with computer usage. Many states require offenders 
to notify local law enforcement of all email and social network 
usernames and passwords, plus any changes to those usernames or 
passwords.111 As of 2009, Alaska requires all registrants, regardless of 
conviction date or risk level, to disclose their email addresses, instant 
messaging address, and other Internet communication identifiers when 
registering as a sex offender.112 Indiana requires an offender to disclose 
any email address, instant message username, electronic chat room 
username, or social networking website username that the sex offender 
uses or intends to use.113 And, also as of 2009, members of the Alaskan 
public can submit an email address, instant message address, or other 
Internet identifier to the Department of Public Safety and receive a 
confirmation of whether that address or identifier has been registered by 
a sex offender or child kidnapper.114 
But that is not all. In Indiana, for example, an offender who 
registers electronic or social networking information must also consent to 
searches of personal computers, or any device with Internet capacity, at 
any time.115 The offender must also agree to the installation of hardware 
 
 108. State ex rel. Olivieri v. State, 779 So. 2d 735, 739 (La. 2001) (quoting La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 15:542(B)). 
 109. The statute requires sex offenders and child predators alike to provide local law enforcement 
with detailed information including: the name and aliases used by the offender; physical description of 
the offender; addresses, including temporary housing, employment, and school; a current photograph; 
fingerprints, palm prints and a DNA sample; a description of every vehicle registered to or operated 
by the offender, including license plate number; a copy of the offender’s driver’s license; and every 
email address, online screen name, or other online identifiers used by the offender to communicate on 
the Internet. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:542(C)(1) (2011).  
 110. Id. 
 111. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-21.5(14) (2011). 
 112. Alaska Stat. Ann. § 12.63.010(b)(1)(I) (West 2010). 
 113. Ind. Code § 11-8-8-8(a)(7) (2011), invalidated by Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 2009); 
see N.Y. Correct. Law § 168b-10 (2011). 
 114. Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1001 n.13 (Alaska 2008). 
 115. Ind. Code § 11-8-8-8(b). For discussion of the impact of this law on the Fourth Amendment, 
see Doe v. Indiana, 566 F. Supp. 2d 862, 879 (D. Ind. 2008) (finding the search was unconstitutional 
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that would monitor Internet usage.116 Such consent is required no matter 
the level of risk the offender poses, or even whether the conviction 
resulted from illegal online activity.117 
C. Expanding Notification Requirements 
Fundamentally, notification laws were appended to registration laws 
to provide communities with appropriate and necessary information 
about sex offenders residing in their communities.118 When community 
notification schemes were first introduced, they were tailored to funnel 
information from law enforcement agencies and other designated entities 
to the communities in a narrow and controlled manner.119 In upholding 
the constitutionality of the first generation of notification laws, courts 
emphasized two foundational aspects. First, courts found that the 
information was no greater than that discerned from the public record of 
a conviction,120 and second, that the amount of personal information 
disseminated was specifically tied to the risk level of the offender.121 
 
because registrants who are not on supervised release “are entitled to full Fourth Amendment 
protection, without the lowered expectation of privacy”).  
 116. Ind. Code § 11-8-8-8(b). 
 117. Id. § 11-8-8-8. 
 118. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 93 (2003) (“The legislature further determined that 
‘release of certain information about sex offenders to public agencies and the general public will assist 
in protecting the public safety.’” (quoting 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 41, § 1)); Community Protection 
Act, § 401, 1990 Wash. Sess. Laws 49 (“The legislature finds that . . . law enforcement’s efforts to 
protect their communities . . . are impaired by the lack of information available to law enforcement 
agencies about convicted sex offenders who live within the law enforcement agency’s jurisdiction.”). 
 119. See, e.g., State v. Cook, 700 N.E.2d 570, 585 (Ohio 1998) (upholding the state’s registration 
statute as “narrowly tailored to disseminate information only to those persons necessary in order to 
protect the public,” namely, law enforcement, neighbors, and certain school officials); see also State v. 
Myers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1028 (Kan. 1996) (Abramson, J., dissenting) (observing that, at the time, the 
majority of jurisdictions kept the information confidential and that only a few registration schemes 
“show[ed] a trend toward limited public disclosure”). 
 120. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 98 (“[T]he stigma of Alaska’s Megan’s Law results not 
from public display for ridicule and shaming but from the dissemination of accurate information about 
a criminal record, most of which is already public.”); E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1099 (3d Cir. 
1997) (“The ‘sting’ of Megan's Law for tier 2 and 3 registrants results not from their being publicly 
displayed for ridicule and shaming but rather from the dissemination of accurate public record 
information about their past criminal activities and a risk assessment by responsible public agencies 
based on that information.”); State v. Haskell, 784 A.2d 4, 11 (Me. 2001) (“The ‘[d]issemination of 
[accurate information about past criminal activity] in and of itself has never been regarded as 
punishment . . . .’” (quoting E.B., 119 F.3d at 1099–1100 (alternation in original))). 
 121. See, e.g., Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1278 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[New York’s notification statute 
was] carefully calibrated to, and depends solely upon, the offender’s perceived risk of re-
offense . . . .”); State ex rel. Olivieri v. State, 779 So. 2d 735, 739 n.9 (La. 2001) (“[Louisiana’s sex 
offender statute] originally only provided that [c]riminal justice agencies are authorized to release 
relevant and necessary information regarding sex offenders to the public when release of the 
information is necessary for public protection . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cook, 700 
N.E.2d at 574–75 (comparing the information disseminated for “sexual predators” versus “sexually 
oriented offenders”). 
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Thus, if there was little likelihood of reoffense, fewer community 
members received a smaller amount of personal information. 
Today, however, these controlling principles have been replaced by 
a new paradigm: Residents of any community are entitled to great 
amounts of information about all sex offenders, without regard to their 
likelihood of reoffense.122 The release of this information affects 
registrants’ lives in ways far more consequential than the lingering effect 
that public knowledge of a conviction may generate. And it is not just 
because of the amount of information—it is also because of the subtext 
of the message. In Knowledge as Power, Wayne Logan argues that the 
context in which the information is conveyed is “far from neutral.”123 The 
release of sex offenders’ information contains an implicit message of 
dangerousness because states have intentionally singled out sex offenders 
from other offenders for this specific treatment, thus “contradict[ing] 
governmental neutrality.”124 
1. The Nature of the Information Released 
Because many modern notification schemes do not distinguish 
among offenders,125 they provide the public with a significant amount of 
information about all offenders,126 including detailed physical 
descriptions of the registrants,127 their home and work addresses, “and 
links to maps of their locations.”128 Upheld by the Supreme Court in 
Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, online registries are not 
required to distinguish between those individuals who pose a high risk to 
society and those who pose a low risk.129 Additionally, because online 
 
 122. See, e.g., Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind. 2009) (“[Indiana’s registration scheme] 
makes information on all sex offenders available to the general public without restriction and without 
regard to whether the individual poses any particular future risk.”). 
 123. Logan, supra note 51, at 138. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. Ann. § 18.65.087(b) (West 2010); Fla. Stat. § 943.44353(1) (2011) 
(providing for automatic public notification of registration information for sex offenders and sexual 
predators alike); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 846E-3 (West 2011); Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-21.5 (2011); Wis. 
Stat. § 301.46(5)(4)(bm) (2011). But see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 6, § 178(D) (2011) (prohibiting 
publication of level one and level two offenders’ registration information on Massachusetts’s sex 
offender Internet database). 
 126. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15.542.1(A) (2011) (requiring any convicted sex offender to “give 
notice of the crime for which he was convicted, his name, residential address, a description of his 
physical characteristics . . . and a photograph” by mail to one person in every residence or business 
within a one-mile or three-tenths of a mile radius of where the offender will reside and to the 
superintendent of the school district in which the offender will reside). 
 127. See, e.g., Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1001 (Alaska 2008) (“A photograph of each registrant 
appears on a webpage under the caption ‘Registered Sex Offender/Child Kidnapper.’ Each registrant’s 
page also displays the registrant’s physical description, home address, employer, work address, and 
conviction information.”). 
 128. Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 376 (Ind. 2009). 
 129. 538 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2003); see, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:542.1(A) (articulating the same 
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registries generally use the same font size and coloring when labeling all 
registrants, the posts create an air of perceived danger around all 
offenders.130 
Not only are comprehensive posts the order of the day, the posts are 
made available to an extensive list of persons. In New York, for example, 
a low-risk offender’s information may be provided to “any entity with 
vulnerable populations related to the nature of the offense committed by 
such sex offender.”131 “Vulnerable population” is not defined in New 
York’s sex offender statute, so it is within the discretion of the law 
enforcement agency to determine what entities will receive “relevant 
information.”132 Plus, “[a]ny entity receiving information on a sex 
offender may disclose or further disseminate such information at its 
discretion.”133 
In a critique of Connecticut’s online registry that included all 
offenders regardless of their risk, the Second Circuit called it an 
“instrument . . . too blunt” to “protect the health and welfare of the 
State’s children.”134 The fallout from such widespread posting should not 
be minimized. The Third Circuit recognized that “[p]eople interact with 
others based on the information they have about them.”135 For sex 
offenders whose information is publicly available on the Internet, the 
fear of retributive violence or harassment “[is] not short lived.”136 
Some notification laws appear to provide limitations on the 
information released. But the presence of these terms is misleading. 
Under Washington’s Community Protection Act of 1990, for example, 
the release of information is dependent on an agency determination that 
the “information is relevant and necessary to protect the public and 
counteract the danger created by the particular offender.”137 While the 
terms “necessary and relevant” seem to restrict dissemination, in 
practice, public agencies in Washington may exercise their discretion in 
deciding when to notify the public and whom to notify.138 No hard limits 
 
notification procedures for all sex offenders); Bertram v. State, 2009-Ohio-5210U, ¶ 42 (Ct. App.) 
(“[E]very offender must provide identical information, and the information is published in the same 
manner for every offender.”).  
 130. For example, each entry in Alaska’s registry includes the heading “sex offender/child 
kidnapper” in large blue lettering, but identifies the specific offense in small, black font at the bottom 
of the page. Sex Offender/Child Kidnapper Registration Central Registry, Alaska Dep’t of Pub. 
Safety, http://www.dps.alaska.gov/sorweb/aspx/sorcra1.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). 
 131. N.Y. Correct. Law § 168-l(6)(a) (2011). 
 132. Id. § 168-l. 
 133. Id. § 168-l(6)(a) (emphasis added). 
 134. Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety ex rel. Lee, 271 F.3d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 2001), rev’d sub nom. Conn. 
Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003). 
 135. E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1102 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.550(1) (2011). 
 138. Id.; see N.Y. Correct. Law § 168-l(6)(a) (2011). 
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are placed on Washington’s public agencies in interpreting the state’s 
notification provisions.139 
2. Access to the Information 
When community notification statutes were first introduced, there 
was concern that a registrant’s privacy interest was severely 
compromised by the disclosure of detailed personal information.140 While 
this argument holds merit, courts nevertheless declared community 
notification statutes constitutional because, on balance, the collected 
data were disseminated in a controlled manner and contained no more 
information than what is otherwise disseminated by the fact of 
conviction.141 In State v. Cook, the Ohio Supreme Court found the state’s 
notification provision to be an “objectively reasonable measure to warn 
those . . . most likely to be potential victims,”142 with disclosure 
specifically aimed at “those most likely to have contact with the 
offender.”143 But, almost ten years later, the Ohio Supreme Court dealt 
with a “significantly modified” statute in Bertram v. State.144 When 
Bertram came before the court, Ohio’s sex offender statute required that 
an “offender’s information . . . be open to public inspection 
and . . . included in the internet sex offender and child-victim offender 
database.”145 
Current notification laws provide the public with unfettered access 
to considerable personal information that would otherwise be “far less 
accessible” to them.146 A few short years ago, by comparison, hard copies 
 
 139. Doe v. Gregoire, 960 F. Supp. 1478, 1481 (W.D. Wash. 1997) (“On the face of the statute, all 
information provided by the registrant (including his address and place of employment) could be 
publicized. No notice or hearing is required, and no guidelines are provided to the local agencies.”). 
For judicial interpretation of Washington’s “necessary and relevant” language, see State v. Ward, 869 
P.2d 1062, 1071 (Wash. 1994) (upholding the language in the belief that it ensures that notification will 
“fit the threat posed to public safety”). 
 140. See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 411 (N.J. 1995) (acknowledging that notification laws link 
some information together that otherwise would not be readily discernible); see also Brief for the 
Comm. for Pub. Counsel Servs. & the ACLU of Mass. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, Doe v. 
Att’y Gen., 686 N.E.2d 1007 (Mass. 1997) (No. SJC-07481), 1997 WL 33832824, at *29 (contending 
that registrants suffer invasion of privacy because the public is able to retrieve data from a “readily 
accessible location”). 
 141. See, e.g., Poritz, 662 A.2d at 404 (“[T]he notification provisions are as carefully tailored as one 
could expect in order to perform their remedial function without excessively intruding on the 
anonymity of the offender.”); see also State v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1036–37 (Kan. 1996) (finding a 
notification statute nonpunitive because of its provisions for only limited disclosure). 
 142. 700 N.E.2d 570, 581 (Ohio 1998). 
 143. Id. at 585; see Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1090 (9th Cir. 1997); Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 
1263, 1269 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 144. 2009-Ohio-5210U, ¶ 32 (Ct. App.). 
 145. Id. ¶ 20. 
 146. See State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 23 (Me. 2009); Bertram, 2009-Ohio-5210U, ¶ 32 (“Besides 
the change in the classification system, the increase in the duration and frequency of the requirements 
for registration, and the increase in the information provided, the access of the public to the 
Carpenter_24 (J. Grantz) (Do Not Delete) 4/19/2012 6:23 PM 
1094 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:1071 
of registries were maintained by local law enforcement and available to 
the public “during normal business hours.”147 The introduction of the 
Internet has made “the geographic reach of this information 
boundless.”148 An offender’s information is globally disseminated through 
online state-maintained registries, and individuals from any part of the 
world—whether they may ever be contemplated future victims or even 
have contact with the offender—can access a state’s online registry and 
the accumulated personal information on it. 
The evolution of Utah’s notification laws offers one example. The 
state’s original notification scheme restricted dissemination of an 
offender’s registration information to individuals who were the victim of 
a sex offense or who lived within the offender’s zip code or an adjoining 
one.149 Prompted by “a backlog of information requests,” Utah’s 
legislature eliminated this geographical restriction on the dissemination 
of registration information in 1998.150 Because the amended statute did 
not place any restrictions on the dissemination of information, Utah’s 
Department of Identification, the agency responsible for maintaining the 
state’s central registry, created an online registry.151 Today, anyone with 
access to the Internet can access Utah’s sex offender registry, “regardless 
of [the person’s] place of residence or any other specific need.”152 
But it is not just the Internet where information is posted. Today, 
dissemination of public information comes in many forms. One modern 
notification law also contemplates dissemination by “any other notice 
deemed appropriate by the court . . . including but not limited to signs, 
handbills, bumper stickers, or clothing labeled to that effect.”153 
 
information has been greatly increased through the use of an internet database . . . .”). 
 147. Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety ex rel. Lee, 271 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 2001), rev’d sub nom. Conn. 
Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 584 U.S. 1 (2003). 
 148. Doe v. Dist. Att’y, 932 A.2d 552, 568 (Me. 2007) (Alexander & Silver, JJ., concurring). 
 149. Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 1247 (10th Cir. 2000); see Doe v. Dist. Att’y, 932 A.2d at 
557 (noting that Maine’s Bureau of Identification is now required to post on the Internet much of the 
same information that previously could be retrieved by the public only through written request). 
 150. Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1247. 
 151. Id. at 1247–48; see Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 91 (2003) (“The Act does not specify the means 
by which the registry information must be made public. Alaska has chosen to make most of the 
nonconfidential information available on the Internet.”). 
 152. Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1248; see Doe v. Lee, 132 F. Supp. 2d 57, 69 (D. Conn. 2001) (“[T]he 
website makes information available to millions of people who will never come to the state or 
otherwise come into contact with a registrant.”), aff’d sub nom. Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety ex rel. Lee, 
271 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 2001), rev’d sub nom. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 584 U.S. 1 (2003). 
 153. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:542.1(A)(3) (2011). Dissemination comes in all forms. See, e.g., 
Michael Dear & Django Sibley, The One-Way Strategy for Sex Offenders Makes Nobody Safe, L.A. 
Times, Oct. 1, 2000, at M6 (“Police handed out fliers and notified local media about Linares’ crimes, 
physical description, address and the license-plate number of a car registered to his family.”); Todd S. 
Purdum, Death of Sex Offender Is Tied to Megan’s Law, N.Y. Times, July 9, 1998, at A16 (discussing 
the suicide of a registered “high risk” sex offender who “was one of 6 such offenders singled out by the 
Santa Rosa Police Department . . . in its first effort at public notification”). 
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3. Removal from Registries 
Although significant energy and resources have been expended to 
create broad-based notification systems, states have devoted insufficient 
thought to developing mechanisms to remove offenders from the 
registries. In some states, no mechanism exists for removal of a 
registrant’s information from the government’s online registry,154 possibly 
due in part to the recognition of how difficult such a task might be.155 
And even where procedures are in place for removal, a jurisdiction may 
be vested with discretion to continue to provide information to law 
enforcement, regardless of whether the person is still required to 
register.156 
Even where removal is contemplated, the use of the Internet to 
disseminate information creates significant challenges in attempting to 
remove an offender’s information from an online registry. Unlike a 
generation ago, where a damning flyer or notice could be removed from 
a storefront wall, registration information on the Internet is forever 
“etched in cyberspace.”157 
Ricky Blackmun’s story is not atypical. Ricky was sixteen when he 
had sexual intercourse with his thirteen-year-old girlfriend.158 The offense 
occurred in Iowa, where Ricky’s record was eventually expunged.159 But 
Ricky’s family had moved to Oklahoma to get a fresh start after Ricky’s 
conviction.160 In Oklahoma, Ricky was required to register as a tier III 
sex offender, a classification that entailed having his driver’s license 
stamped with the words “sex offender” just below his picture in red 
letters.161 It was not until four years later that Ricky’s name was removed 
from the registry when Oklahoma’s legislature passed a law that 
expunged offenders’ records in Oklahoma of certain offenses committed 
in other jurisdictions.162 Although Ricky’s name was removed from the 
 
 154. See, e.g., Col. Rev. Stat. § 16-22-111 (2011); Fla. Stat. §§ 943.0435(11)(a)(3), 943.04354 
(2011); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 34-A, §§ 11221, 11225-A (2011); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.101 
(2009). But see Wis. Stat. § 301.46(6)(a) (2011) (allowing dissemination of information only for the 
period during which an offender is required to register). 
 155. Doe v. Dist. Att’y, 932 A.2d 552, 562 (Me. 2007) (“[R]emoval may be both technically and 
practically difficult in light of websites . . . which take ‘snapshots’ of web pages and archive them for 
posterity.”); see Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1286 (2d Cir. 1997) (addressing briefly the difficulty of 
removing offenders’ information post registration). 
 156. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 301.46(6)(b) (providing that law enforcement agencies may be 
permitted access to an offender’s registration information “for law enforcement purposes” even after 
registration period terminates). 
 157. Doe v. Dist. Att’y, 932 A.2d at 568 n.21 (Alexander & Silver, JJ., concurring). 
 158. Grinberg, supra note 44. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
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state’s sex offender registry,163 the impact of the “sex offender” label 
continues to haunt him. In one interview, Ricky discussed the fear he 
feels wherever he goes, a result of the lingering concerns he believes that 
others may have about him.164 
D. The New Generation of Residency Restrictions 
Residency restrictions serve as an accurate barometer for the 
increasing harshness of sex offender registration schemes.165 Generally 
upheld as civil nonpunitive measures,166 residency restrictions prohibit 
convicted sex offenders from residing near designated locations “where 
minors congregate,” such as schools, day-care centers, and recreational 
parks and playgrounds.167 Where enacted, they are intended to apply to 
all registrants,168 including those whose convictions occurred prior to the 
enactment of the particular residency restriction,169 those whose crimes 
 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See, e.g., Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 706 (8th Cir. 2005) (“In smaller towns, a single school or 
child care facility can cause all of the incorporated areas of the town to be off limits to sex offenders 
[due to residency restrictions].”); In re E.J., 223 P.3d 31, 38–40 (Cal. 2010) (reviewing the stricter 
provisions embodied in Jessica’s Law). 
 166. See, e.g., Miller, 405 F.3d at 704–05 (finding that residency restrictions do not violate 
constitutional principles); Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 766 n.8 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that 
the city’s decision to ban the offender from parks “was not ‘punishing’ him at all,” but was a civil 
measure designed to protect the public); Coston v. Petro, 398 F. Supp. 2d 878, 887 (S.D. Ohio 2005) 
(determining that residency restrictions are not punitive in nature). 
 167. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 42-1-15 (2011) (prohibiting sex offenders from living within 1000 
feet of a school, day-care center, or area where minors congregate); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/11-9.3(b) 
(2009) (barring sex offenders from loitering within 500 feet of a playground, child-care centers, or 
facilities that offer programs for children); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17.545 (West 2007) (barring sex 
offenders from residing within 1000 feet of any preschool, primary or secondary school public 
playground or licensed child day-care facility); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2950.034 (West 2011) 
(restricting sex offenders from residing within 1000 feet of any school, preschool, or child day-care 
center), invalidated by State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108 (Ohio 2011) (ruling that sections of the 
state’s sex offender laws unconstitutionally increase the punishment for crimes committed before the 
law took effect); Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-21.7 (2011) (prohibiting sex offenders from being in the 
area, on foot or in or on any motorized or nonmotorized vehicle, of any day-care facility, public park, 
or primary or secondary school). 
 168. See, e.g., Miller, 405 F.3d at 721 (“[Iowa’s residency restrictions] appl[y] ‘regardless of whether 
a particular offender is a danger to the public.’” (quoting Doe v. Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d 844, 871 (S.D. 
Iowa 2004))); State v. Pollard, 908 N.E.2d 1145, 1153 (Ind. 2009) (“The statute does not consider the 
seriousness of the crime, the relationship between the victim and the offender, or an initial 
determination of the risk of re-offending.”); Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437, 441 (Ky. 2009) 
(“While the original residency restriction statute applied only to those on probation, parole, or other 
form of supervised release, the current statute applies to all registrants regardless of probation or 
parole status.”). 
 169. See, e.g., Miller, 405 F.3d at 723 (affirming Iowa’s residency restrictions); In re E.J., 223 P.3d at 
34. Recently, however, courts have begun to question the constitutionality of such restrictions. See, 
e.g., Pollard, 908 N.E.2d at 1154 (finding that Indiana’s residency restrictions violated the prohibition 
on ex post facto laws because it imposes a burden that has the effect of adding punishment beyond 
that which could have been imposed at the time of sentencing); Baker, 295 S.W.3d at 447 (determining 
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were committed against adult victims,170 and those whose crimes were of 
a nonsexual nature.171 
When first introduced, restrictions often contemplated a buffer zone 
of 1000 feet or less.172 By today’s standards, that would be considered 
minimal. Current legislative enactments boast buffer zones of up to 2500 
feet.173 In addition to enlarging the zones, legislatures have broadened the 
concept of “where children congregate” to include bus stops,174 video 
arcade centers,175 and libraries.176 Moreover, it is often the offender who 
has to keep track of whether a day-care center or video arcade moves to 
within 1000 feet of his home. Thus, the burden is placed on the offender 
to determine compliance.177 Compounding that burden, most residency 
restrictions do not include any type of “move-to-the-offender exception,” 
which would exempt the offender from leaving an already established 
residence when the prohibited sites moves into the neighborhood.178 As 
expanding residency restrictions play out against the community 
landscape, one thing is clear: Larger buffer zones with more points of 
 
that residency restrictions violate ex post facto principles when applied to previously convicted 
offenders); Berlin v. Evans, 923 N.Y.S.2d 828, 834–35 (Sup. Ct. 2011) (same). 
 170. See, e.g., Pollard, 908 N.E.2d at 1153 (“Although denominated as applying only to ‘offender[s] 
against children,’ the residency restriction statute is actually much broader.”); Baker, 295 S.W.3d at 
444 (“Even those registrants whose victims were adults are prohibited from living near an area where 
children gather.”).  
 171. For a detailed look at the various components of sex offender registration laws, see Brian J. 
Love, Regulating for Safety or Punishing Depravity? A Pathfinder for Sex Offender Residency 
Restriction Statutes, 43 Crim. L. Bull. 834, 839–53 (2007). 
 172. See Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Collectivism and Ex-Offender Residence Exclusion Laws, 
92 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 6–7 (2006) (noting that the average residency restriction zone in 2006 was 1000 feet). 
 173. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 15-20A-11(a) (2011) (enlarging the state’s residency restriction zone 
from 1000 feet to 2000 feet); Cal. Penal Code § 3003.5 (2011) (increasing the state’s residency 
restriction zone to 2000 feet under Jessica’s Law); Okla. St. Ann. tit. 57 § 590A (West 2011) (2000 
feet); see also Damien Cave, Roadside Camp for Miami Sex Offenders Leads to Lawsuit, N.Y. Times, 
July 10, 2009, at A14 (reporting on the growing number of sex offenders forced to camp out on 
Miami’s Julia Tuttle Causeway because of a residency restriction barring registrants from living within 
2500 feet of where children gather). 
 174. See H. 4323, 116th Sess. (S.C. 2006) (prohibiting certain sex offenders from residing within 
1000 feet of bus stops). 
 175. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:91.1a(2) (2011) (adding freestanding video arcades to the list of 
locations). 
 176. See H.R. 7621, Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2006) (barring child predators from residing within 500 feet of 
day-care facilities, schools, public parks, playgrounds, libraries). 
 177. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 42-1-15 (2011); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17.545 (West 2007), 
invalidated by Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437 (Ky. 2009); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2950.034 
(West 2011), invalidated by State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108 (Ohio 2011). But see Ala. Code § 15-
20A-11(c) (2011) (“Changes to property within 2000 feet of an adult criminal sex offender's registered 
address which occur after an adult criminal sex offender establishes residency or accepts employment 
shall not form the basis for finding that a criminal sex offender is in violation of [residency restrictions].”). 
 178. Mann v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 653 S.E.2d 740, 742 (Ga. 2007) (“Under the terms of [Georgia’s 
sex offender] statute, it is apparent that there is no place in Georgia where a registered sex offender 
can live without being continually at risk of being ejected. [It] contains no move-to-offender exception 
to its provisions.”). 
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reference effectively freeze out most sex offenders from the vast majority 
of communities in the United States.179 
E. Introduction of GPS Monitoring Systems 
Global Positioning Satellite (“GPS”) monitoring is a relatively 
recent addition to registration schemes. In 2005, Florida’s state 
legislature passed Jessica’s Law, which provided for the use of GPS or 
other electronic devices to track certain sex offenders after release from 
confinement.180 Subsequently, in 2006, as part of the Adam Walsh Act, 
the federal government offered grant programs and technical assistance 
to states in order to implement similar electronic monitoring programs.181 
Inspired by Florida’s legislation and spurred on by the federal 
incentives in the AWA, as many as thirty-nine states have amended their 
sex offender statutes to permit some form of electronic monitoring of 
convicted sex offenders.182 A number of monitoring programs are 
imposed on sex offenders as a condition of, and for the duration of, 
parole or supervised release.183 However, several states impose electronic 
 
 179. Jurists, scholars, and journalists alike have recognized the magnitude of the impact that 
residency restrictions have on offenders. See, e.g., Mann, 653 S.E.2d at 744 (“[Georgia’s residency 
restrictions do] not merely interfere with, it positively precludes [a registrant] from having any 
reasonable investment-backed expectation in any property purchases as his private residence.”); 
Berlin v. Evans, 923 N.Y.S.2d 828, 835 (Sup. Ct. 2011) (acknowledging that the registrant, a tier I 
offender, was effectively banished from living in Manhattan). For articles criticizing residency 
restrictions, see Amanda Moghaddam, Popular Politics and Unintended Consequences: The Punitive 
Effect of Sex Offender Residency Restriction Statutes from an Empirical Perspective, 40 S.W. L. Rev. 
223 (2010); Richard Tewksbury, Exile at Home: The Unintended Collateral Consequences of Sex 
Offender Residency Restrictions, 42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. Rev. 531 (2007); Monica Davey, Iowa’s Residency 
Rules Drive Sex Offenders Underground, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 2006, at A1 (reporting on the 
consequences of Iowa’s residency restrictions and calling into question the restrictions’ effectiveness); 
Carol DeMare, Efforts to Protect Kids Often Carry Own Risks, Albany Union Times, Sept. 9, 2007, at 
A1 (describing the travails of one offender who moved and was unable, because of residency 
restrictions, to find housing of any kind); Skipp & Campo-Flores, supra note 49 (reporting on 
displaced persons around the country). 
 180. State Statutes Related to Jessica’s Law, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures Criminal 
Justice Program, http://www.leg.state.vt.us/WorkGroups/sexoffenders/NCSLs_Jessicas_Law_Summary.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 17, 2012) [hereinafter State Statutes Related to Jessica’s Law]. 
 181. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 621, 120 Stat. 587, 
633–34 (2006) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 16981 (2010)) (authorizing the Attorney General to 
award grants to states and local governments to carry out programs to outfit sex offenders with 
electronic monitoring units). 
 182. State Statutes Related to Jessica’s Law, supra note 180, at 1; see, e.g., Ala. Code § 15-20A-20 
(2011); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-902(G) (2011); Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-923 (2011); Cal. Penal 
Code § 3004 (2011); Fla. Stat. § 947.1405(7) (2011); Ga. Code Ann. § 42-1-14 (2011); Ind. Code § 11-
13-3-4(j) (2011); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:560.4 (2011); Mich. Comp. Laws § 791.285 (2011); Mo. Rev. 
Stat. § 217.735 (2011); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-21-10.1(E) (West 2011); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.40B 
(2011); Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 510.10 (2011); S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-540 (2011); Wash. Rev. Code 
§ 9.94A.704(5) (2011). 
 183. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-902(G); Fla. Stat. § 947.1405; Ind. Code § 11-13-3-4(j); 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 47 (2011); S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-540(A); Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.704(5). 
Carpenter_24 (J. Grantz) (Do Not Delete) 4/19/2012 6:23 PM 
May 2012] SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION LAWS 1099 
monitoring on statutorily specified offenders for the duration of the 
offenders’ natural life.184 And in most cases, individuals subject to 
electronic monitoring are also required to reimburse the state for the 
cost of the monitoring program.185 
Similar to other registration burdens, electronic monitoring 
provisions are “drawn on broad categorical grounds” that do not allow 
for individualized determination of dangerousness or likelihood of 
recidivism.186 In Massachusetts, for example, legislation demands that any 
person who is placed on probation following conviction for certain 
proscribed sex offenses must wear a GPS device at all times.187 Prior to 
this enactment, a sentencing judge could exercise discretion in imposing 
GPS monitoring as a condition of probation.188 Today, the sanction 
“applies without exception to convicted sex offenders sentenced to a 
probationary term, regardless of any individualized determination of 
their dangerousness or risk of reoffense.”189 
The introduction of GPS monitoring programs has not affected the 
offender’s obligation to comply with registration burdens. An offender 
who is required to register may also be required to wear an electronic or 
GPS monitoring device for the duration of registration.190 Because of the 
recent emergence of GPS monitoring, case law is still developing to 
determine whether the imposition of GPS constitutes punishment or 
 
 184. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 3004 (establishing lifetime monitoring by GPS for those 
individuals convicted of an offense that requires lifetime registration); Ga. Code Ann. § 42-1-14(e) 
(requiring lifetime monitoring for sexually dangerous predators); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:560.4 
(requiring lifetime electronic monitoring for sexually violent predators and child sexual predators); 
Mich. Comp. Laws § 791.285(1) (authorizing lifetime electronic monitoring); Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 217.735(1), (4) (requiring lifetime monitoring for any offender convicted of any of thirteen listed 
offenses). 
 185. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-923(c)(1)(a)\; Ga. Code Ann. § 42-1-14(e); Mass. Gen. 
Laws ch. 265, § 47; Mich. Comp. Laws § 791.285(2); S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-540(K). 
 186. Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 Duke L.J. 1321, 1333, 1337 (2008) (“[E]lectronic 
monitoring requirements tend to be triggered by broad categorical classifications based on prior 
conviction without regard to present status within the criminal justice system.”); see Commonwealth v. 
Cory, 911 N.E.2d 187, 193 (Mass. 2009) (“[T]he GPS requirement [is] uniformly imposed on every 
defendant . . . without regard to present dangerousness, and even if there are no exclusion zones that 
can reasonably be applied to the defendant.”). For examples of codification of these principles, see 
Cal. Penal Code § 3004 (requiring lifetime GPS monitoring for every offender convicted of an 
offense for which lifetime registration is required); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.40 (imposing satellite-
based monitoring on any offender who falls within one of the three delineated categories of 
offenders). 
 187. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 47. 
 188. Cory, 911 N.E.2d at 197–98. 
 189. Id. at 197. 
 190. See State Statutes Related to Jessica’s Law, supra note 180 (listing a number of statutes that 
require electronic monitoring of convicted sex offenders who are subject to registration as a result of 
their conviction). 
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whether it can be viewed as one burden among many in a civil regulatory 
scheme.191 
F. On the Horizon: Even Harsher Legislation 
SORNA and its progeny have not proven to be the final word on 
sex offender legislation. A review of proposed federal and state 
legislation indicates that we have yet to reach peak proliferation of these 
laws. Proposed congressional bills would: give power to the Secretary of 
State to revoke, restrict, or limit a passport issued to an individual who is a 
sex offender under the AWA;192 require sex offenders to notify 
government agencies when they travel internationally;193 provide notice to 
foreign countries upon the intended travel of a convicted high-risk sex 
offender;194 prohibit sex offenders from working in property management 
or maintenance where they have access to others’ residences;195 and 
withdraw burial-related benefits for certain offenders.196 One bill proposed 
expanded funding for programs using GPS as a sentencing option.197 
State proposals are equally extensive and equally random. Proposals 
include expanding the list of registerable offenses to include tongue-
kissing of a minor;198 requiring offenders to register with campus police if 
attending school;199 barring sex offenders from attending festivals or 
participating in Halloween activities;200 increasing the reach of residency 
restrictions;201 and requiring weekly registration for homeless offenders.202 
 
 191. A minority of jurisdictions have determined that GPS is punitive and therefore cannot be 
applied retroactively or tacked on as a modification of probation. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Goodwin, 933 N.E.2d 925, 935 (Mass. 2010) (“GPS monitoring, paired with geographic exclusions is so 
punitive in effect as to increase significantly the severity of the original probationary conditions . . . .”); 
Cory, 911 N.E.2d at 195 (determining that the GPS requirement has a pronounced punitive effect, and 
consequently may not be applied retroactively). 
 192. H.R. 5870, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 193. Sex Offender Notification of International Travel Act, H.R. 6266, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 194. International Megan’s Law of 2009, H.R. 1623, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 195. Safety from Sex Offenders Act of 2011, S. 329, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 196. Hallowed Grounds Act, H.R. 2355, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 197. GPS Protection & Safety Act of 2009, H.R. 3528, 111th Cong. (2009) (creating a grant 
program to assist states in establishing programs that use GPS to track offenders as an alternative to 
incarceration). 
 198. Va. Code Ann. §§ 9.1–902, 18.2-370.6 (2011).  
 199. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:542(B)(3) (2011). 
 200. Tighter Restrictions for Registered Sex Offenders Under Proposed County Ordinance 
Amendment, Lake Elsinore-Wildomar Patch (Apr. 13, 2011), http://lakeelsinore-wildomar.patch.com/ 
articles/tighter-restrictions-for-registered-sex-offenders-under-proposed-county-ordinance-ammendment. 
Florida’s sex offender statute already prohibits any offender convicted of an offense against a victim 
who was under eighteen years of age at the time of the offense, absent a pardon or release from the 
requirement to register, from  
distributing candy or other items to children on Halloween; wearing a Santa Claus costume, 
or other costume to appeal to children, on or preceding Christmas; wearing an Easter Bunny 
costume, or other costume to appeal to children, on or preceding Easter; entertaining at 
children's parties; or wearing a clown costume without prior approval from the commission.  
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II.  Regulatory vs. Punitive: A Primer on the Difference 
To characterize a particular piece of legislation as “civil” or 
“punitive” defines the rights and obligations that flow from that 
classification. Sometimes labels matter. Laws deemed civil or regulatory 
in nature need not meet constitutional demands traditionally associated 
with criminal laws. 
Most drafted legislation is easily ascribed to one camp or the other, 
but as the Supreme Court observed, “The notion of punishment, as we 
commonly understand it, cuts across the division between civil and 
criminal.”203 That comment aptly describes sex offender registration 
schemes, which share the characteristics both of a civil regulation 
designed to protect the public and of a system of punitive burdens 
imposed on the registrant’s liberty. In fact, Justice Souter made that 
particular observation in Smith v. Doe when he stated, “[T]he indications 
of punitive character . . . and the civil indications . . . are in rough 
equipoise.”204 A New York trial court framed well the tension of 
competing regulatory and penal policies in affixing the appropriate label 
when it noted that a residency restriction was intended to “protect 
children” but “[o]n the other hand . . . also intended to increase 
punishment against convicted sex offenders.”205 
Where legislation can be cast as either civil or criminal, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez shapes the inquiry.206 
Called the “intent-effects test,”207 courts readily acknowledge a two-step 
process for making the determination.208 The first step of the inquiry is to 
resolve whether the legislature intended the statute to be a civil remedy 
 
Fla. Stat. § 947.1405(12) (2011) (emphasis added). 
 201. John Lyon & Rob Moritz, Bill to Tighten Sex Offender Rules Passes House, Ark. News (Feb. 
28, 2011), http://arkansasnews.com/2011/02/28/bill-to-tighten-sex-offender-passes-house (reporting on a 
bill to increase residency restrictions for level two sex offenders to match restrictions for level three 
and four offenders). 
 202. Ala. Code § 15-20A-12(b) (2011). 
 203. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447–48 (1989) (assessing whether civil fines constituted 
a second punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause). 
 204. 538 U.S. 84, 110 (2003) (Souter, J. concurring). Justice Souter concluded, “[W]hat tips the 
scale for me is the presumption of constitutionality normally accorded a State’s law.” Id. Other courts 
that have upheld such laws also have acknowledged that the question is a close one. See, e.g., 
Rodriguez v. State, 93 S.W.3d 60, 70 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). 
 205. Berlin v. Evans, 923 N.Y.S.2d 828, 834 (Sup. Ct. 2011). 
 206. 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963) (articulating seven factors to be used to determine whether a 
regulation is punitive). 
 207. See People v. Logan, 705 N.E.2d 152, 158–60 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (applying the Mendoza-
Martinez test, which it labeled the “intent-effects test,” to determine whether a sex offender 
registration statute was constitutional). 
 208. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997) (describing the two levels of inquiry 
required to determine the issue); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248–49 (1980); State v. Lomas, 
955 P.2d 678, 680 (Nev. 1998) (describing a two-part test to be applied to determine whether 
revocation of a driver’s license was punishment). 
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or a punishment.209 Assuming the legislature intended the law to be 
civil,210 the second step of the inquiry is whether, despite regulatory aims, 
the law is so punitive in fact that it “may not be legitimately viewed as 
civil in nature.”211 
In the case of sex offender registration laws, the first step of the 
inquiry has been resolved without much debate: Courts have regularly 
found that legislatures intended registration schemes to be civil remedies 
and not punishment.212 On occasion, a court will rely on the fact that the 
legislature placed the registration scheme outside the criminal code.213 
But in most cases, the legislative preamble articulates a nonpunitive civil 
purpose.214 The legislative findings recorded in Idaho’s Sexual Offender 
 
 209. See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 277 (1996) (describing the first stage of inquiry into 
whether double jeopardy applied as whether Congress intended the forfeiture law to be a “remedial 
civil sanction”); see also Ward, 448 U.S. at 249 (scrutinizing as a first stage of inquiry whether it was 
clear that Congress intended to impose a civil penalty upon the defendant); Femedeer v. Haun, 
227 F.3d 1244, 1248 (10th Cir. 2000) (utilizing the intents-effects test); Lescher v. Fla. Dep’t of 
Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 985 So. 2d 1078, 1082 (Fla. 2008) (analyzing whether the Florida 
legislature intended a law that permanently revoked driver licenses to be a civil regulation or a 
punishment). In the area of sex offender registration, see Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 433 (N.J. 1995) 
(describing the first part of the intent-effects test). 
 210. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 103 (“It is evident that Congress intended the . . . money penalties 
and debarment sanctions imposed for violations of 12 U.S.C. §§ 84 and 375b to be civil in nature.”); 
Ward, 448 U.S. at 248–49 (recognizing clear congressional intent to characterize monetary penalties 
under the Clean Water Act as civil in nature); Turner v. Glickman, 207 F.3d 419, 428 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that a law disqualifying drug offenders from receiving food stamp benefits was a civil remedy 
because of congressional intent to confer authority to an administration agency). 
 211. Ursery, 518 U.S. at 288 (deciding whether in rem civil forfeiture was so extreme and 
disproportionate in comparison to the government’s damages that it had to be considered punitive); 
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (determining whether civil fines added to criminal 
penalties violated the Double Jeopardy Clause). 
 212. See, e.g., Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1249 (declaring that the intent of the legislature “was clearly to 
establish a civil remedy”); Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437, 443 (Ky. 2009) (analyzing the 
express and implied intent of the legislature to conclude that the registration scheme was civil); State 
v. Haskell, 784 A.2d 4, 16 (Me. 2001) (adopting the legislature’s express statement that SORNA was 
intended to be civil). But see Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1007–08 (Alaska 2008) (refusing to analyze 
the law under the first step of the intents-effects test because the law was punitive in its effect); 
Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 379 (Ind. 2009) (observing that the legislature’s intent was not clear 
from the record). 
 213. See, e.g., State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 16 (Me. 2009) (noting that the placement of Maine’s 
registration and notification laws “entirely outside of the Criminal Code” was one indicia that the 
scheme was intended to be a civil regulation). 
 214. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 93 S.W.3d 60, 68–69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (relying on the 
legislative preamble to confirm that the statute was enacted with a civil purpose). Legislative 
preambles regularly state that the registration scheme was enacted as a civil measure. See, e.g., Ark. 
Code Ann. § 12-12-902 (2011) (“[P]rotecting the public from sex offenders is a primary governmental 
interest, and . . . the privacy interest of the persons adjudicated guilty of sex offenses is less important 
than the government’s interest in public safety.”); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 34-A, § 11201 (2011) (“The 
purpose of this chapter is to protect the public from potentially dangerous registrants and offenders by 
enhancing access to information concerning those registrants and offenders.”); Mich. Comp. Laws 
§ 28.721a (2011) (“The legislature has determined that a person who has been convicted of committing 
an offense covered by this act poses a potential serious menace and danger to the health, safety, 
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Registration Notification and Community Right-to-Know Act215 offer a 
representative example: 
The legislature finds that sexual offenders present a danger and that 
efforts of law enforcement agencies to protect their communities, 
conduct investigations and quickly apprehend offenders who commit 
sexual offenses are impaired by the lack of current information 
available about individuals who have been convicted of sexual offenses 
who live within their jurisdiction. The legislature further finds that 
providing public access to certain information about convicted sexual 
offenders assists parents in the protection of their children.216 
However, the intent-effects test emphasizes that, even if a 
legislature intends a statute to serve a purpose other than punishment, 
the statute may nonetheless be deemed to impose a criminal penalty if 
the statutory scheme is “so punitive either in purpose or effect . . . as to 
transform what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal 
penalty.”217 Consequently, the judicial task has been to discern narrowly 
tailored legislation designed to meet regulatory aims from legislation that 
is excessive in relation to its nonpunitive purpose. 
To help resolve whether a particular piece of legislation is excessive, 
Mendoza-Martinez identified seven factors to guide the determination of 
whether a law is punitive in nature despite its civil rhetoric:  
[1] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, 
[2] whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment[,] [3] 
whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether its 
operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution 
and deterrence, [5] whether the behavior to which it applies is already 
a crime, [6] whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally 
be connected is assignable for it, and [7] whether it appears excessive in 
relation to the alternative purpose assigned . . . .218 
 
morals, and welfare of the people, and particularly the children, of this state.”). 
 215. Idaho Code Ann. § 18-8301 (2011). 
 216. Id. § 18-8302; see Ark Code Ann. § 12-12-902 (2011) (“The General Assembly finds that sex 
offenders pose a high risk of reoffending after release from custody, that protecting the public from 
sex offenders is a primary governmental interest, that the privacy interest of persons adjudicated guilty 
of sex offenses is less important than the government’s interest in public safety, and that the release of 
certain information about sex offenders to criminal justice agencies and the general public will assist in 
protecting public safety.”); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:540 (2011) (“[P]rotection of the public from sex 
offenders, sexually violent predators, and child predators is of paramount governmental interest.”); 
Miss. Code Ann. § 45-33-21 (2011) (“The Legislature finds that the danger of recidivism posed by 
criminal sex offenders and the protection of the public from these offenders is of paramount concern 
and interest to government.”). 
 217. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted); see United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447–48 (1989) (concluding that an excessive fine 
was punishment because there was no rational relationship to the remedial purpose of compensating 
the government); United States v. Juvenile Male, 590 F.3d 924, 940–41 (9th Cir. 2009) (determining 
that the public dissemination of a juvenile sex offender’s information is punitive in effect because of 
the high degree of confidentiality afforded juveniles). 
 218. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1962). The multifactored Mendoza-
Martinez test is not free from criticism. See, e.g., Artway v. N.J. Att’y Gen., 81 F.3d 1235, 1263 (3d Cir. 
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While all seven Mendoza-Martinez factors inform this inquiry,219 the 
Court cautioned that so great is the weight given to the legislature’s 
regulatory aim that “[a]bsent conclusive evidence . . . as to the penal 
nature of a statute,” the Court will not upset a civil characterization.220 
Even where a law may have punitive characteristics, the State’s interest 
in creating a regulatory scheme will override the punitive nature of the 
law.221 Indeed, only the “clearest proof” of punition will outweigh 
countervailing legislative intent.222 
Requiring “clearest proof” to overturn legislative intent is not 
unusual, nor does it apply only to the Mendoza-Martinez analysis. Cast in 
other terms, it merely demonstrates the Court’s adherence to the 
fundamental principle that great deference is afforded to legislative 
authority to create and define an offense.223 Indeed, the presumption of 
constitutionality cloaks all legislation.224 Justice Souter’s concurrence in 
Smith v. Doe underscored this point when he stated, “What tips the scale 
 
1996) (crafting a three-prong test analyzing the (1) actual purpose, (2) objective purpose, and (3) effect 
of a regulation to determine whether it imposed a civil or a criminal penalty); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 
367, 388 (N.J. 1995) (“But while the role of these constitutional provisions as protectors of individual 
rights must always be fully enforced, care should be exercised not to convert them into obstacles that 
prevent the enactment of honestly-motivated remedial legislation by subjecting laws to tests [such as 
Mendoza-Martinez] unsuited to the underlying purpose of these constitutional provisions.”). 
 219. See Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 379–84 (Ind. 2009) (analyzing in detail each of the seven 
Mendoza-Martinez factors in determining that Indiana’s sex offender registration scheme was 
punitive). 
 220. 372 U.S. at 169; see Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) (“[T]he presumption of 
constitutionality with which this enactment, like any other, comes to us forbids us lightly to choose that 
reading of the statute's setting which will invalidate it over that which will save it.”). 
 221. See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 364–65 (1984) (finding that 
a law requiring the forfeiture of firearms sold by unlicensed dealers was intended by Congress as a 
civil regulatory measure).  
 222. See Flemming, 363 U.S. at 617 (“[O]nly the clearest proof could suffice to establish the 
unconstitutionality of a statute on such a ground.”); see also Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 107 (2002) 
(Souter, J., concurring) (“‘[O]nly the clearest proof’ that a law is punitive based on substantial factors 
will be able to overcome the legislative categorization.”); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 
(1997) (espousing that only “the clearest proof” will work to override legislative intent to enact a 
remedial measure and turn it into a criminal penalty); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369 (1986) 
(indicating that the civil label may be rebutted by the clearest proof that it is punitive); United States 
v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980). But see Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 115 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(“I would not demand ‘the clearest proof’ that the statute is in effect criminal rather than civil. Instead, 
guided by [Mendoza-Martinez], I would neutrally evaluate the Act’s purposes and effects.”); United 
States v. Juvenile Male, 590 F.3d at 931 (noting the impossibility of the defendant being able to develop a 
“record which contains the ‘clearest proof’ of the punitive effects that the law will have upon him”). 
 223. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957) (recognizing that courts give considerable 
weight to legislative authority to define an offense); see also Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 
424 (1985) (“The definition of the elements of a criminal offense is entrusted to the legislature . . . .”); 
Chi., Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 559, 578 (1911) (“The power of the 
legislature to declare an offense . . . cannot, we think, be questioned.”). 
 224. See, e.g., State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 12 (Me. 2009) (“A statute is presumed to be constitutional 
and the person challenging the constitutionality has the burden of establishing its infirmity.”). 
Carpenter_24 (J. Grantz) (Do Not Delete) 4/19/2012 6:23 PM 
May 2012] SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION LAWS 1105 
for me [in this close question] is the presumption of constitutionality 
normally accorded a State’s law.”225 
Wide latitude, however, does not translate to unchecked legislative 
freedom. Legislatures may not exercise their power to draft or modify 
laws free of all constitutional restraint.226 Consequently, courts regularly 
strike down laws that, despite a particular legislative intent, have been 
deemed to violate constitutional principles.227 
And herein lies the critical threshold issue: Can it be said that 
ramped-up sex offender registration laws continue to warrant the label of 
civil remedial sanctions, or have they morphed into criminal penalties 
cloaked in civil rhetoric? The balance of the Article argues that under 
the Mendoza-Martinez multifactored test, spiraling amendments have 
tipped the schemes to the punitive228—and that tip unravels their 
constitutionality.229 
III.  Proving Punition 
Excessive legislation may prove to be SORNA’s Achilles’ heel. This 
Part argues that escalating burdens have cast a net far wider than 
rationally related to a civil alternative purpose. And because of overly 
broad legislation, super-registration schemes (1) impose a significant 
affirmative restraint not previously considered, and (2) when viewed 
cumulatively and collectively, are so excessive that they are no longer 
rationally connected to their nonpunitive purpose. 
As noted earlier, when a law is deemed to be punitive, substantive 
and procedural constitutional protections must flow from that 
determination.230 One constitutional limitation on criminal legislation is 
the Ex Post Facto Clause,231 which prohibits retroactive application of a 
law that “inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, 
when committed.”232 Ex post facto challenges have arisen in a variety of 
 
 225. 538 U.S. at 110 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 226. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (striking down a Texas law that 
criminalized sodomy). 
 227. See id. at 564 (concluding that a statute prohibiting certain sexual behavior between 
consenting adults intruded on a liberty interest); Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 68 (Nev. 2001) (declaring 
that the legislature’s attempt to abolish the insanity defense violated principles of due process). 
 228. For the landmark discussion of the social phenomenon of tipping points, see Malcolm 
Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference (2000). For 
examples of a variety of legal scholarship on this phenomenon, see Carpenter, supra note 3, at 1 n.1. 
 229. See State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1113 (Ohio 2011) (determining that, in the aggregate, 
Ohio’s amended sex offender scheme had become punitive). 
 230. See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S 242, 248 (1980) (“The distinction between a civil penalty 
and a criminal penalty is of some constitutional import.”). 
 231. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10 (“No state shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto Law . . . .”). 
 232. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798); see Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43 
(1990) (“Legislatures may not retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment 
for criminal acts.”). But see Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 250 (2001) (determining that the 
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contexts. Litigants have challenged whether sanctions, such as the 
imposition of fines or forfeiture of property were, in fact, criminal 
penalties governed by the constraints of the ex post facto principle.233 
To date, registrants have rarely been successful in mounting ex post 
facto challenges because of the difficulty they face in meeting the 
Mendoza-Martinez requirements to prove punition.234 Additionally, there 
is great pushback from legislators, who argue for retroactive application 
of the laws because of the high incidence of recidivism among sex 
offenders.235 The argument continues: Effectiveness of enforcement, 
therefore, necessitates that these laws apply to all offenders, including 
those never subjected to registration when first convicted, as well as 
those who had been adjudged lower risk under previous but more lenient 
versions of the scheme.236 After all, an act’s influence would dilute 
significantly if registration laws exempted previously convicted offenders 
thought to be dangerous to the public.237 In Doe v. Poritz, the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey adopted this rationale when it accepted the state’s 
position that “there was no justification in protecting only children of the 
future from the risk of reoffense.”238 
 
commitment of sexually violent felons was a civil remedy that did not implicate either the Ex Post 
Facto Clause or the Double Jeopardy Clause). 
 233. See, e.g., Youngblood, 497 U.S. at 44 (rejecting the contention that an after-imposed fine 
constitutes an ex post facto criminal penalty); see also United States v. Reed, 924 F.2d 1014, 1016–17 
(11th Cir. 1991) (concluding that forfeiture of substituted property did not violate ex post facto 
principles); United States v. Eleven Vehicles, 836 F. Supp. 1147, 1162 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (opining that the 
forfeiture statute in question was civil and consequently not affected by ex post facto principles). For a 
rich discussion on the application of ex post facto principles to quasi-criminal penalties, see Harold J. 
Krent, The Puzzling Boundary Between Criminal and Civil Retroactive Lawmaking, 84 Geo. L.J. 2143, 
2149 (1996) (contending that the Supreme Court has been “surprisingly permissive” in the civil 
context). 
 234. See sources cited supra note 233. In the state courts, there has been a notable shift, as three 
jurisdictions have concluded that registration schemes violate ex post facto principles because they are 
punitive. See Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 2009); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4 (Me. 2009); 
State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108 (Ohio 2011). 
 235. In part, this was the Government’s contention in Carr v. United States, which addressed the 
narrow question of whether criminal penalties for an offender’s failure to register upon moving across 
state lines should apply to offenders who did so prior to SORNA’s enactment. See 130 S. Ct. 2229, 
2240–41 (2010). The amicus brief filed in Smith v. Doe by the Council of State Governments, the 
National Governors Association, and a number of other entities, also provides an excellent example of 
the argument. See Brief for Council of State Gov’ts et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (No. 01-729), 2002 WL 1268682. 
 236. See Carr, 130 S. Ct. at 2238, 2240–41 (criticizing the government’s argument that subjecting 
pre-SORNA offenders to travel restrictions is a necessary law enforcement tool). 
 237. See United States v. Fuller, 627 F.3d 499, 505–06 (2d Cir. 2010) (adopting the Attorney 
General’s position that applying SORNA to offenders convicted prior to the enactment of the Act was 
central to the enforcement of a comprehensive system). 
 238. 662 A.2d 367, 373 (N.J. 1995). The Poritz court further observed that if the notification law 
had exempted previously convicted offenders, “the law would have provided absolutely no protection 
whatsoever on the day it became law, for it would have applied to no one.” Id. 
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However compelling this argument appears at first glance, 
retroactive application of any law is valid only if the law is deemed to be 
remedial in nature. By a vote of 5–4, the Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe 
concluded exactly that. It held that the first generation of sex offender 
registration laws, represented by the Alaska Sex Offender Registry Act, 
did not violate ex post facto principles because sex offender registration 
schemes cannot be characterized as punishment.239 
At first blush, one might suppose that the nonapplicability of ex post 
facto principles to sex offender registration schemes is a settled issue 
because of the Court’s ruling in Smith. Certainly, the Seventh Circuit so 
concluded when it wrote, “[W]hether a comprehensive registration 
regime targeting only sex offenders is penal . . . is not an open 
question.”240 Indeed, perhaps in deference to what it perceived to be the 
controlling federal principle from Smith, the Indiana Supreme Court in 
2009 based its determination that Indiana registration laws violated ex 
post facto principles on adequate and independent state constitutional 
grounds, rather than on federal ex post facto principles.241 
However “tempting” it is to conclude that Smith controls,242 it would 
be a mistake to do so because the statutory landscape has so dramatically 
altered.243 While one can argue the merits of the Smith decision—that is, 
whether punitive indices were sufficiently present in 2003 to warrant a 
different conclusion—significant changes to registration schemes prompt 
the following question: Can it be argued that super-registration schemes 
post-SORNA include the very characteristics the Court found lacking in 
2003? 
 
 239. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105–06 (2003) (“Our examination of the Act’s effects leads to the 
determination that respondents cannot show, much less by the clearest proof, that the effects of the 
law negate Alaska's intention to establish a civil regulatory scheme. The Act is nonpunitive, and its 
retroactive application does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.”). 
 240. United States v. Leach, 639 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2011). Although the 2010 Supreme Court 
decision in Carr addressed an ex post facto challenge, the opinion never grappled with the 
fundamental issue of whether sex offender registration schemes were punitive, relying instead on 
statutory construction to determine that burdens attached to failure to register were intended to apply 
only to prospective travelers. See 130 S. Ct. at 2237. 
 241. Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 377–78 (Ind. 2009). For a similar response, see Doe v. State, 
189 P.3d 999 (Alaska 2008) (holding that Alaska’s registration and notification law violated the ex post 
facto clause of Alaska’s state constitution). 
 242. See United States v. Juvenile Male, 590 F.3d 924, 931 (9th Cir. 2009) (“It would be tempting to 
conclude, without looking carefully at the special circumstances of former juvenile offenders, that in 
light of [Smith v. Doe] sex offender registration by its nature does not constitute punishment.”). 
Although the Ninth Circuit concluded that Smith v. Doe may not always control, it nonetheless 
accorded deference to the Court’s decision. See id. at 932. 
 243. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (“The doctrine of stare decisis is essential to 
the respect accorded to the judgments of the Court and to the stability of the law. It is not, however, an 
inexorable command.”). For an interesting discussion on the role of stare decisis in judicial 
decisionmaking in the United States, see Mortimer N.S. Sellers, The Doctrine of Precedent in the 
United States of America, 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 67 (2006). 
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A. Affirmative Disability or Restraint 
At its paradigmatic core, the term “affirmative disability or 
restraint” employed in Mendoza-Martinez refers to imprisonment244 or an 
act that is akin to loss of freedom.245 In the seminal case Hudson v. United 
States, the Court viewed debarment from the banking industry as not 
“involv[ing] ‘an affirmative disability or restraint’ as that term is 
normally understood. While petitioners have been prohibited from 
participating in the banking industry, this is certainly nothing 
approaching the infamous punishment of imprisonment.”246 Relying on 
the Hudson framework—imprisonment versus anything short of loss of 
freedom—courts have concluded, often summarily, that the following 
laws do not impose an affirmative disability or restraint: the denial of 
Social Security benefits,247 permanent revocation of one’s driver’s 
license,248 withdrawal of the right to food stamps,249 cancellation of an 
alcoholic beverage license,250 and termination of ownership rights in 
horses.251 
Unfortunately, the Hudson line of cases does not offer sufficient 
direction because burdens demanded of sex offender registrants require 
more detailed analysis than the perfunctory “this is not imprisonment” 
analysis offered by those cases. Smith v. Doe helps shape the inquiry on 
whether registrants suffer from an affirmative disability or restraint as 
used in Mendoza-Martinez.252 Using traditional definitions of 
punishment, the Court posed three questions to determine whether the 
law imposed a physical restraint or disability: (1) whether the law 
involves physical restraint; (2) if no physical restraint, whether the law 
involves a restriction on activities that could otherwise be considered 
restraint; and (3) if no restraint, either physically or effectively, whether 
the sanctions imposed involve the type of shame and humiliation 
traditionally associated with shaming punishments from colonial times.253 
 
 244. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 104 (1997) (distinguishing between disbarment from 
the banking industry and the “‘infamous punishment’ of imprisonment”). 
 245. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357 (1997) (recognizing an individual’s constitutionally 
protected interest in avoiding physical restraint); see also Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 111 (2003) 
(Stevens J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“Proper analysis . . . begin[s] with a 
consideration of the impact of the statutes on the registrants’ freedom.”). 
 246. 522 U.S. at 104 (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 247. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) (“Here the sanction is the mere denial of a 
noncontractual government benefit. No affirmative disability or restraint is imposed . . . .”). 
 248. See, e.g., Lescher v. Fla. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 985 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 
2008); State v. Evans, 550 S.E.2d 853 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001). 
 249. See Turner v. Glickman, 207 F.3d 419, 431 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 250. See Ex Parte Sheridan, 974 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. App. 1998). 
 251. See State v. Almendarez, 301 S.W.3d 886, 892–93 (Tex. App. 2009). 
 252. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 99 (2003). 
 253. Id. at 98–101. 
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Having concluded that registration and notification schemes do not 
involve physical or effective restraints,254 the Court considered whether 
they nonetheless equal shaming punishments from colonial times.255 
Although Smith v. Doe analyzed specifically the Alaska Sex Offender 
Registry Act, the Court offered comparative analogies to distinguish sex 
offender registration schemes from historical noncorporal acts 
traditionally deemed punishment. To this end, the Court identified 
hallmarks of shaming punishments to include: banishment,256 loss of 
freedom of movement,257 public shame and humiliation,258 occupational or 
housing disadvantages,259 and conditions analogous to probation or 
supervised release.260 The majority found these indices lacking in 
sufficient degree to warrant a finding that the Alaska Sex Offender 
Registry was punitive.261 Today, however, super-registration schemes are 
readily identifiable by these hallmarks of shaming. 
1. Banishment 
Banishment defines the most serious of colonial shaming 
punishments.262 Historical banishment involved “[expulsion] from the 
community,” where “[the offenders] could neither return to their original 
community nor, reputation tarnished, be admitted easily into a new 
one.”263 By contrast, the Smith v. Doe Court found that sex offender 
registrants were not effectively banished from their communities; 
registrants were “free to move where they wish and to live and work as 
other citizens, with no supervision.”264 
That assumption is no longer accurate given the sweeping nature of 
current residency restrictions.265 Today, in the vast majority of 
 
 254. Id. at 98–99. 
 255. Id. at 99–100. 
 256. Id. at 99–101. 
 257. Id. at 99. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. at 100. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at 97–102. Separate dissents by Justice Ginsburg (joined by Justice Breyer) and Justice 
Stevens vehemently opposed the characterization that sex offender registration laws did not involve 
affirmative disabilities or restraints. See id. at 111 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part) 
(“The statutes impose significant affirmative obligations and a severe stigma on every person to whom 
they apply.”); id. at 115 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Beyond doubt, the Act involves an ‘affirmative 
disability or restraint.’”). 
 262. Id. at 98 (majority opinion). 
 263. Id.  
 264. Id. at 101; see Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 719 (8th Cir. 2005) (determining that Iowa’s 
residency restrictions did not affect banishment because they only restricted where offenders may 
reside as opposed to expelling them from communities or prohibiting access to areas near schools or 
child-care facilities). 
 265. See State v. Pollard, 908 N.E.2d 1145, 1153 (Ind. 2009) (“Restricting the residence of 
offenders based on conduct that may have nothing to do with crimes against children, and without 
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communities, registrants are not free to live or work where they wish.266 
The Smith Court’s observation that Alaskan registrants were free to 
move about the state only underscores the how quickly the landscape of 
registration schemes is changing. The Supreme Court of Kentucky, 
commenting on case law that had addressed this issue, observed that 
although a majority of courts had “avoided or sidestepped” the issue of 
whether residency restrictions constitute banishment, dissenting judges 
have been “far more intellectually honest concluding that residency 
restrictions constitute banishment.”267 
Indeed, this is the face of modern day banishment. Stories 
corroborate the assessment that offenders are made homeless or 
transient because of residency restrictions.268 For example, in South 
Florida, a group of convicted offenders huddle “under the Julia Tuttle 
Causeway, which spans Miami’s Biscayne Bay,” in squalid living 
conditions because there is no community in South Florida where they 
may reside without violating residency restrictions.269 One offender, who 
had moved from Ohio to Kentucky because of Ohio’s residency 
restrictions, was arrested in Kentucky “for living within 1000 feet of East 
Covered Bridge Park, allegedly a public playground.”270 In Manhattan, a 
seventy-seven-year-old convicted offender was banished from his 
residence of over forty years because of amended New York residency 
restrictions.271 Homeless offenders in Suffolk County, New York, “were 
crammed into a trailer that periodically moved around until finally 
settling on the grounds of the county jail.”272 In Georgia, a registrant, 
peacefully residing in his community with his wife, was almost forced to 
leave it when child-care facilities sprung up within 1000 feet of his home 
 
considering whether a particular offender is a danger to the general public, the statute exceeds its non-
punitive purposes.”). 
 266. See supra Part I.D. (describing the impact of residency restrictions on registrants’ movement). 
 267. Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437, 444 (Ky. 2009). 
 268. See, e.g., Mann v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 653 S.E.2d 740, 755 (Ga. 2007) (“[I]t is apparent that 
there is no place in Georgia where a registered sex offender can live without being continually at risk 
of being ejected.”); see also Wendy Koch, More Sex Offenders Transient, Elusive: Homeless Life May 
Increase Crime Risk, USA Today, Nov. 19, 2007, at A1 (“Residency restrictions are the linchpin for 
causing homelessness among sex offenders.”). 
 269. Skipp & Campo-Flores, supra note 49; see also Skipp, supra note 49. So well-known are the 
conditions of the Julia Tuttle Causeway that a recent episode of a television show depicted the 
protagonist searching for someone among groups of sex offenders who had set up camp under the 
bridge. See Dexter: First Blood (Showtime television broadcast Oct. 24, 2010). 
 270. Baker, 295 S.W.3d at 441. The court in that case noted that “the Division of Probation and 
Parole provided [the offender] with a link to a website to determine whether he was in compliance 
with [Kentucky’s residency restrictions]. The website did not show East Covered Bridge Park and the 
surrounding area to be a prohibited zone.” Id. 
 271. See Berlin v. Evans, 923 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829, 831–32 (Sup. Ct. 2011). 
 272. Skipp & Campo-Flores, supra note 49 (exposing the unintended consequences of residency 
restrictions). 
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and business.273 To compound the injury, he had already been forced to 
vacate another residence three years earlier because of Georgia’s 
residency restriction statutes.274 
2. Loss of Freedom of Movement 
Offenders suffer serious restrictions on their freedom of movement. 
In addition to constructive banishment, the introduction of residency 
restrictions and GPS monitoring systems have affected offenders’ ability 
to integrate into communities, find stable homes, and obtain steady 
employment. As the Ohio Supreme Court persuasively articulated in 
State v. Williams, it is the cumulative effect of all of these requirements—
not a separate analysis of each burden—that accurately portrays the 
effect these requirements have on the offenders subject to them.275 
The burdens associated with periodic registration can be 
significantly intrusive.276 In 2003, in response to that concern, Smith v. 
Doe theorized that the lack of in-person registration helped refute the 
claim that offenders were under an affirmative disability.277 Within a few 
years, when in-person registration had become the norm, Maine’s 
Supreme Court reasoned that  
it belies common sense to suggest that a newly imposed lifetime 
obligation to report to a police station every ninety days to verify one’s 
identification, residence, and school, and to submit to fingerprinting 
and provide a current photograph, is not a substantial disability or 
restraint on the free exercise of individual liberty.278 
While in-person registration is “continuing, intrusive, and 
humiliating,”279 a requirement that a GPS device be permanently 
attached to an offender’s person is “dramatically more intrusive and 
 
 273. Mann v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 653 S.E.2d 740, 742 (Ga. 2007) (finding Georgia’s residency 
restrictions unconstitutional insofar as they permitted the regulatory taking of the defendant’s home 
without just compensation, but determining that the defendant had failed to establish that the work 
restriction prohibiting him from entering his business had a sufficient economic impact). 
 274. Mann v. State, 603 S.E.2d 283, 285–86 (Ga. 2004). 
 275. Compare State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1113 (Ohio 2011) (finding that all of the changes 
enacted by recent amendments to Ohio’s sex offender laws in the aggregate, rather than any one 
change in particular, warranted the conclusion that imposing the current registration requirements on 
an offender whose crime was committed prior to the amendments is punitive), with Femedeer v. Haun, 
227 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2000) (analyzing the effect of Utah’s Internet notification scheme by itself in 
determining that the notification scheme imposed only a “civil burden” on sex offenders). 
 276. See, e.g., Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1009 (Alaska 2008) (describing registration requirements 
as “significant and intrusive”); see also Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 379 (Ind. 2009) 
(acknowledging the burdensome nature of in-home personal visitation to verify an offender’s address); 
State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 24–25 (Me. 2009) (recognizing the burden associated with the 
requirement to register in-person every ninety days). 
 277. See 538 U.S. 84, 101 (2003). 
 278. Letalien, 985 A.2d at 24–25 (explaining the new burdens imposed on lifetime registrants 
following the 1999 amendments to the state’s 1995 registration law). 
 279. Doe v. Dist. Att’y, 686 N.E.2d 1007, 1016 (Mass. 1997) (Fried, J., concurring). 
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burdensome.”280 A GPS monitoring device affects an offender’s ability to 
travel by airplane; to bathe, swim, scuba dive, camp, or travel to rural 
areas; and even the ability to enter certain buildings.281 Though the North 
Carolina Supreme Court recognized that the state’s satellite-based 
monitoring program “may affect a participant’s daily activities,”282 it 
ultimately found that neither the purpose nor the effect of the program 
negated the legislature’s civil intent in implementing it.283 
In stark contrast to the view of the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina,284 the Massachusetts Supreme Court has determined that GPS 
monitoring renders a registration statute punitive in effect because it 
imposes a substantial burden on liberty as part of an offender’s sentence 
“in two ways: by its permanent, physical attachment to the offender, and 
by its continuous surveillance of the offender’s activities.”285 And because 
GPS monitoring is imposed as part of an offender’s sentence for certain 
crimes, the Massachusetts Supreme Court determined that the statute is 
punitive in effect.286 
 
 280. Commonwealth v. Cory, 911 N.E.2d 187, 196 (Mass. 2009). 
 281. See State v. Bowditch, 700 S.E.2d 1, 4 (N.C. 2010). As the court explained, the transmitting 
device used for North Carolina’s program required periodic recharging and could lose its satellite 
connection in some buildings or if submerged underwater. Id. The transmitting device was worn on a 
belt around the shoulder or waist and could not be hidden under clothing. Id. 
 282. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).  
 283. Id. at 11 (“[The requirements necessary to operate [satellite-based monitoring] ‘make a valid 
regulatory program effective and do not impose punitive restraints.’” (quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 
84, 102 (2003))). 
 284. Id. (determining that the effects of GPS monitoring were “no more onerous than the harsh 
effects of the regulations found to be nonpunitive in occupational debarment cases” and in cases of 
civil confinement). 
 285. In Cory, 911 N.E.2d at 196, the Massachusetts Supreme Court explained,  
There is no context other than punishment in which the State physically attaches an item to 
a person, without consent and also without consideration of individual circumstances, that 
must remain attached for a period of years and may not be tampered with or removed on 
penalty of imprisonment. Such an imposition is a serious, affirmative restraint.  
 286. Id. at 197; see Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 933 N.E.2d 925, 935 (Mass. 2010). When 
registration is required as part of a defendant’s sentence, retroactive application of new registration 
requirements, like additional conditions of probation, is an unconstitutional modification of, and 
enhancement to, the offender’s criminal sentence. See People v. Castellanos, 982 P.2d 211, 222 (Cal. 
1999) (Kennard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“If the legislature intended the sanction 
to be imposed in a criminal proceeding it probably intended the sanction to be punitive. Probably, but 
not necessarily.”); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 20 (Me. 2009) (declaring that registration was required 
as “an integral part of the criminal sentencing process and resulting sentence” for the offender’s crime, 
so that retroactive application of SORNA made more burdensome the punishment for a crime after its 
commission).  
The first wave of sex offender statutes subjected offenders to registration as part of their criminal 
sentence. More recently, in an effort to avoid those constitutional protections necessary to the 
retroactive enforcement of criminal laws, many states have since required that registration be imposed 
at the time the court imposes a sentence rather than as part of the offender’s sentence. See, e.g., Doe v. 
Dist. Att’y, 932 A.2d 552, 564 (Me. 2007) (Alexander & Silver, JJ., concurring) (describing the change 
in Maine’s law). 
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Residency restrictions and exclusion zones impose yet another 
affirmative disability on registered offenders. Residency restrictions have 
an almost unbearable impact on a registered sex offender’s ability to 
move freely. The threat of eviction hangs over the heads of registered 
offenders because there is always the potential that the offender will be 
forced from any new residence whenever a third party chooses to 
establish within the exclusion zone a business that statutorily bars sex 
offenders.287 
In fact, exclusion zones do not prohibit only residency; in some cases 
they attempt to prohibit movement.288 Massachusetts, for example, 
sought to establish exclusion zones that would not only prevent offenders 
from living in areas where they might come into contact with children, 
“but even from passing through such areas while driving to another 
destination.”289 When used together, GPS monitoring plus geographic 
exclusion zones “could dramatically limit an offender’s freedom of 
movement.”290 As one commentator observed, exclusion zones, residency 
restrictions, and electronic monitoring programs have severely limited a 
registrant’s freedom of movement without the state ever having to erect 
a single wall around the registrant.291 
3. Public Shame and Humiliation 
Despite the long line of cases concluding that sex offender 
registration schemes are nonpunitive civil regulations,292 courts 
nonetheless recognize that these laws serve to shame, isolate, and 
ostracize the convicted offender.293 The question, therefore, is not 
 
 287. Mann v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 653 S.E.2d 740, 744 (Ga. 2007); State v. Pollard, 908 N.E.2d 1145, 
1150 (Ind. 2009); Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437, 445 (Ky. 2009); see Brenda Goodman, 
Georgia Justices Overturn a Curb on Sex Offenders, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 2007, at A26 (“‘You live kind 
of every day wondering if the sheriff’s office is going to come out and tell you that you have three days 
to move,’ Mr. Mann said. ‘It’s happened to me twice.’”). 
 288. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 47 (2011) (“The commissioner of probation, in addition to any 
other conditions, shall establish defined geographic exclusion zones including, but not limited to, the 
areas in and around the victim’s residence, place of employment and school and other areas defined to 
minimize probationer’s contact with children, if applicable.”); see Fla. Stat. § 947.1405(12)(a) (2011) 
(permitting the parole commission to designate additional “prohibited locations” to protect a victim). 
 289. Cory, 911 N.E.2d at 196–97 n.19. 
 290. Goodwin, 933 N.E.2d at 935 (“[T]he additional probation condition of GPS monitoring, 
paired with geographic exclusions, is so punitive in effect as to increase significantly the severity of the 
original probationary conditions and therefore may be imposed only after a finding of a violation of a 
condition of probation.”). 
 291. See Murphy, supra note 186, at 1328–29. 
 292. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 96 (2003); Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 
(2003); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369 (1997); Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244. 1253 (10th 
Cir. 2000); State v. Haskell, 784 A.2d 4, 14–16 (Me. 2001). 
 293. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 99 (“It must be acknowledged that notice of a criminal 
conviction subjects the offender to public shame, the humiliation increasing in proportion to the extent 
of the publicity. And the geographic reach of the Internet is greater than anything which could have 
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whether sex offender registrants suffer from some form of public shame 
and humiliation. On that, there is agreement. Rather, the question is 
whether, given the dramatic changes in registration schemes, registrants 
now face public shame and humiliation that rise to the level of historical 
notions of punishment. 
To traverse this minefield, we must remember that an enduring 
tension exists in determining “the exact line at which the dignity and 
convenience of the individual must yield to the demands of the public 
welfare or of private justice.”294 The compelling arguments for public 
dissemination of some information about some sex offenders are real and 
they are meaningful. However, wholesale dissemination of information 
and effective debarment from employment and housing opportunities 
raise the question whether the public shame and humiliation registrants 
suffer are too profound to disregard. 
In concluding that notification schemes were civil in nature, Smith v. 
Doe distinguished the paradigmatic shaming punishments of branding 
and other permanent labels from the publicity associated with 
community notification.295 However, it is no longer valid to assume that 
the shame suffered by registrants is less profound than that suffered by 
colonists. Today, registrants suffer the type of permanent stigmas 
occasioned in colonial times. Using the analytical framework from Smith, 
the town square has been replaced by the Internet, and each time an 
offender’s picture is posted online, that registrant is held up for “face-to-
face shaming,” as described in Smith.296 For one offender, who had been 
convicted in 1990 of one count of indecent liberties with an undercover 
police officer and fined sixty-two dollars, automatic registration as a tier I 
offender would have caused untold embarrassment and humiliation.297 So 
 
been designed in colonial times.”); see also Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 829 (9th Cir. 1997) (“We 
can hardly conceive of a state’s action bearing more ‘stigmatizing consequences’ than the labeling of a 
prison inmate as a sex offender.”); Doe v. Pryor, 61 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1231 (M.D. Ala. 1999) 
(“[C]ommunity notification under the Act will seriously damage [a registrant’s] reputation and 
standing in the community.”); Ray v. State, 982 P.2d 931, 936 (Idaho 1999) (“[R]egistration brings 
notoriety to a person convicted of a sexual offense [and] does prolong the stigma attached to such 
convictions.”); Young v. State, 806 A.2d 233, 249 (Md. 2002) (“Being labeled as a sexual offender 
within the community can be highly stigmatizing and can carry the potential for social ostracism.”). 
 294. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 214 
(1890). 
 295. 538 U.S. at 98 (“[T]he stigma of Alaska’s Megan’s Law results not from public display for 
ridicule and shaming but from the dissemination of accurate information about a criminal record, most 
of which is already public.”); see Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 
Mich. L. Rev. 1880, 1899 (1991) (describing that one classic justification for shaming punishments is 
incapacitation, which “holds that punishment should protect the community from the offender”); 
Brian J. Telpner, Note, Constructing Safe Communities: Megan’s Laws and the Purposes of 
Punishment, 85 Geo. L.J. 2039, 2055 (1997) (arguing that community notification laws constitute 
punishment under a “broad, common-sense meaning of the term”). 
 296. 538 U.S. at 99. 
 297. Doe v. Att’y Gen., 686 N.E.2d 1007, 1009–10 (Mass. 1997) (“He would be embarrassed and 
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significant was his perceived shame that this offender “seriously 
considered suicide rather than face the humiliation and disgrace of 
registering as a sex offender.”298 However, in Roy Martin’s case, the 
shame of being reclassified as a tier III offender actually proved too 
much: Mr. Martin hanged himself rather than face the burdens associated 
with that level of registration.299 
4. Occupational Employment and Housing Disadvantages 
Spiraling amendments have severely restricted the registrant’s 
opportunity for employment and housing.300 The change is palpable from 
2003 when the Smith v. Doe Court commented, “The Act does not 
restrain activities sex offenders may pursue but leaves them free to 
change jobs or residences.”301 Changing jobs or relocating residences at 
will is no longer an option under super-registration schemes. Residency 
restrictions have expanded to such a degree that many parts of the 
country are off-limits to the offender.302 Employment options are equally 
scarce. Faced with scenarios more extreme than those found in Hudson, 
which involved debarment from only the banking industry,303 states have 
barred registrants from all manner of employment.304 Illustrating this 
point is Georgia’s attempt to preclude employment opportunities at any 
business located near industries affecting children.305 
 
humiliated if his children, friends, associates, and co-workers knew that he has had homosexual 
experiences.”). 
 298. Id. at 1009. 
 299. See Grinberg, supra note 6. 
 300. See supra Part I (detailing the changes in the new sex offender laws). 
 301. 538 U.S. at 100; see Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 721 (8th Cir. 2005) (acknowledging that 
Iowa’s residency restrictions were more disabling than those at issue in Smith v. Doe, but finding the 
statute nonpunitive in part because the restrictions at issue were “certainly less disabling” than civil 
commitment schemes); Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 1250 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding that 
registrants were “free to live where they choose, come and go as they please, and seek whatever 
employment they may desire.”). 
 302. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
 303. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 104–05 (1997) (concluding that debarment from the 
banking industry was not sufficiently punitive to outweigh the civil purpose of the sanction, which was 
to promote the stability of that industry). 
 304. See Doe 1 v. Otte, 259 F.3d. 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (“In contrast [to Hudson], the procedures 
employed under the Alaska statute are likely to make the plaintiffs completely unemployable.”), rev’d 
sub nom. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 83 (2003). 
 305. See Ga. Code Ann. § 42-1-15 (2011) (prohibiting registrants from working at any child-care 
facility, school, or church, “or at any business that is located within 1,000 feet of a child care facility, a 
school or church” (emphasis added)); see also La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:553 (2011) (prohibiting 
registrants from operating any bus, taxicab, or limousine for hire, and from engaging in employment as 
a service worker who goes into a residence to provide any type of service, and specifically prohibiting 
any person whose offense involved a minor child from operating any carnival or amusement ride). 
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5. Conditions Similar to Probation or Supervised Release 
As Mendoza-Martinez illustrates, whether a law promotes 
traditional aims of punishment, such as retribution and deterrence, can 
help determine whether a law is punitive.306 In considering whether the 
obligation of registrants to report regularly to their local law 
enforcement was akin to conditions of probation or supervised release, 
the Court concluded that certain hallmarks associated with probation or 
supervised release were not present in the Alaska registration scheme.307 
For example, the registration scheme did not include mandatory 
conditions or the potential for revocation of freedom in case of 
infraction.308 Nor did it require the level of in-person registration or the 
frequency of registration associated with probation or supervised 
release.309 In fact, the lack of in-person registration in Alaska’s scheme 
bolstered the Court’s position that registration was not sufficiently 
similar to supervised release.310 
Similar to the other assumptions underlying Smith v. Doe, this one 
no longer applies. Offenders are not “free to move where they wish and 
to live and work as other citizens, with no supervision.”311 Current 
registration burdens look like probation or supervised release; they 
require registration in person as often as every ninety days,312 as well as a 
variety of other mandatory actions that, if not met, threaten the 
registrant with loss of freedom.313 
 
 306. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, at 168, 182–83 (1963) (reasoning that the 
legislative history, which invited the inference that Congress’s purpose in passing the law at issue was 
to inflict effective retribution against draft evaders, confirmed the conclusion that the law was punitive 
in nature). 
 307. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 101 (2003). 
 308. Id. 
 309.  Id.  
 310. Id. (“[T]he record contains no indication that an in-person appearance requirement has been 
imposed on any sex offender subject to the Act.”). Lower courts have relied on the Court’s message in 
Smith v. Doe. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 93 S.W.3d 60, 70 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (contrasting 
numerous in-person registration requirements with the Texas statute, which, for first-time offenders, 
requires only one registration per move and registration once per year); McCabe v. Commonwealth, 
650 S.E.2d 508, 511 (Va. 2007) (concluding that no liberty interest was affected because of lack of in-
person registration). 
 311. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 101. 
 312. See e.g., Ohio Rev. Code § 2950.06(B)(3) (West 2011), invalidated by State v. Williams, 
952 N.E.2d 1108 (Ohio 2011). 
 313. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 933 N.E.2d 925, 927 (Mass. 2010) (concluding that a 
court may impose GPS monitoring as an additional condition of a registrant’s probation only if the 
registrants violates any of the original conditions); State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108,1111 (Ohio 
2011) (noting that failure to comply with certain registration requirements will subject a sex offender 
to criminal prosecution). Even in 2003, members of the Court believed that registration requirements 
were tantamount to requirements imposed as consequences of other criminal convictions. See Smith v. 
Doe, 538 U.S. at 111 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part). 
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B. Excessiveness 
The final Mendoza-Martinez factor for determining whether a law is 
punitive in nature asks whether the law, in its necessary operation, is 
excessive in relation to its stated regulatory purpose.314 If the means 
chosen to carry out a law’s nonpunitive purpose are excessive, the law 
may be deemed punitive in its effect.315 Courts recognize that this is the 
most critical of the seven factors.316 
Although the vast majority of courts have consistently found that 
registration and notification schemes are rationally connected to their 
proposed goal, namely public safety,317 a fundamental change in these 
schemes threatens the legality of this seventh and final factor. 
Individualized risk assessment, a mainstay of the previous generation of 
sex offender schemes,318 has been replaced by offense-based assessment, 
where individuals are assigned to tiers based on the crimes for which they 
were convicted.319 In many states, courts are no longer permitted to 
 
 314. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963); see Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 97 
(majority opinion). 
 315. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 105 (“The question is whether the regulatory means chosen are 
reasonable in light of the non-punitive objective.”); see Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1017 (Alaska 2008) 
(“We use ‘means’ here to include the scope of the statute and the obligations it imposes on those 
subject to it and what the state can or must do in enforcing it.”). 
 316. See, e.g., Kellar v. Fayetteville Police Dep’t, 5 S.W.3d 402, 409 (Ark. 1999) (“It is the seventh 
and final factor which weighs most heavily in the balance in Arkansas, as in most other states: the 
question of whether the Act is excessive in relation to its alternative purposes.”); State v. Myers, 
923 P.2d 1024, 1041 (Kan. 1996) (“This is the key factor in our analysis.”); Rodriguez v. State, 
93 S.W.3d 60, 75 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (“[O]f all of the Kennedy factors, this factor cuts most directly 
to the question of which statutes cross the boundaries of civil sanctions, and which do not.”); see also 
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 116 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“What ultimately tips the balance for me is 
the Act’s excessiveness in relation to its nonpunitive purpose.”). 
 317. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 102–03; Doe v. State, 189 P.3d at 1015 (“[Alaska’s 
registration scheme] can rationally be viewed as advancing a non-punitive purpose.”); Wallace v. 
State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind. 2009) (“Although [the expansion of Indiana’s sex offender laws] 
supports the view that the effects of the Act are punitive, still the Act advances a legitimate regulatory 
purpose.”); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 22 (Me. 2009) (“[Maine’s] SORNA . . . was enacted to serve 
the legitimate non-punitive purpose of public safety.”). 
 318. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 6, § 178E(f) (2011) (permitting the court to relieve a sex 
offender of his duty to register if “the circumstances of the offense in conjunction with the offender’s 
criminal history indicate that [she] does not pose a risk of reoffense or a danger to the public”); see 
also Letalien, 985 A.2d at 8 (reviewing Maine’s 1991 registration law, which allowed a court to waive 
registration requirements where good cause was shown); State v. Ellison, 2002-Ohio-4024U, ¶ 22 (Ct. 
App.) (explaining that prevailing law at the time of the decision permitted a trial or sentencing court 
to employ factors in order to determine whether to classify an offender as a sexual predator). 
 319. See Doe v. State, 189 P.3d at 1017 (“[O]ffenders cannot shorten their registration or 
notification periods even on the clearest determination of rehabilitation . . . .” (quoting Smith v. Doe, 
538 U.S. at 117 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting))); In re W.M., 851 A.2d 431, 436 (D.C. 2004) (reporting that 
registration requirements are “based on the nature of the offenses . . . committed rather than on an 
individualized assessment of [the] risk of recidivism”); Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437, 446 
(Ky. 2009) (acknowledging that Kentucky’s residency restrictions apply to certain offenders without 
any consideration as to whether they might be a threat to children or to public safety); State v. 
Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1113 (Ohio 2011) (noting that offenders were no longer entitled to a 
Carpenter_24 (J. Grantz) (Do Not Delete) 4/19/2012 6:23 PM 
1118 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:1071 
determine whether a registrant poses a risk to society;320 indeed, many 
states expressly prohibit relief from registration or disclosure 
obligations.321 In her dissent in Smith v. Doe, Justice Ginsburg expressed 
caution regarding the constitutionality of sex offender registration laws 
that do not provide for individualized assessment nor offer the registrant 
the opportunity to demonstrate rehabilitation.322 
The first generation of sex offender legislation permitted trial courts 
to waive registration requirements for certain individuals,323 but many 
states have repealed such provisions.324 As a result, offenders are no 
longer entitled to present any evidence to shorten their registration or 
notification period.325 One offender’s story illustrates the damaging effect 
 
hearing to determine whether they would be classified as a sexually oriented offender, habitual sex 
offender, or sexual predator under Ohio’s amended sex offender statute); see also Commonwealth v. 
Williams, 832 A.2d 962, 965–66 (Pa. 2003) (describing the changes in risk-assessment procedures 
required by the court to afford constitutional protections to the registrants). 
 320. See, e.g., Doe v. State, 189 P.3d at 1017 n.143 (“[Alaska’s registration scheme] does not 
authorize a court to determine that a registrant poses no risk to society and consequently to altogether 
relieve him of registration and disclosure obligations.”); People v. Hofsheier, 129 P.3d 29, 34 (Cal. 
2006) (noting that the duty to register as a sex offender cannot be avoided through a plea bargain or 
through the exercise of judicial discretion); Letalien, 985 A.2d at 9–10 (acknowledging that Maine’s sex 
offender law was amended to eliminate courts’ ability to waive registration on a showing of reasonable 
likelihood that registration was no longer necessary); Williams, 952 N.E.2d at 1113 (noting that judges 
are no longer permitted to review a sex offender’s statutory classification). 
 321. See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:542(F)(1) (2011) (“[T]he sex offender registration and 
notification requirements required by this Chapter are mandatory and shall not be waived or 
suspended by any court.”). 
 322. 538 U.S. at 117 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“And meriting heaviest weight in my judgment, the 
Act makes no provision whatever for the possibility of rehabilitation: Offenders cannot shorten their 
registration or notification period, even on the clearest demonstration of rehabilitation or conclusive 
proof of physical incapacitation.”). Other courts have expressed similar concerns. See, e.g., Letalien, 
985 A.2d at 23 (“No statistics have been offered to suggest that every registered offender or a 
substantial majority of the registered offenders will pose a substantial risk of re-offending long after 
they have completed their sentences and probation, including any required treatment. The registry, 
however, makes no such distinctions.”); State v. Eppinger, 743 N.E.2d 881, 886 (Ohio 2001) (“One 
sexually oriented offense is not a clear predictor of whether that person is likely to engage in the 
future in one or more sexually oriented offenses . . . .”). 
 323. See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 382–83 (N.J. 1995) (upholding a retroactive registration 
requirement and explaining that part of the rationale for doing so was that the scheme included 
individualized assessment); see also State v. Cook, 700 N.E.2d 570, 585–88 (Ohio 1998) (describing the 
hearing to which an offender was entitled). 
 324. See State ex rel Olivieri v. State, 779 So. 2d 735, 737 (La. 2001) (acknowledging that the 
proviso that permitted exclusion from community notification was repealed in 1999); Doe v. Dist. 
Att’y, 932 A.2d 552, 563 (Me. 2007) (noting that Maine’s legislature repealed provisions that had 
allowed sentencing courts to waive registration requirements in 2001). 
 325. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 116–17 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 
at 1017 (“[Alaska’s registration scheme] provides no mechanism by which a registered sex offender 
can petition the state or a court for relief from the obligations of continued registration and 
disclosure.”); Bertram v. State, 2009-Ohio-5210U, ¶ 64 (Ct. App.) (“[T]he offender is not entitled to a 
hearing where a judge could make an independent evaluation of the offender’s specific likelihood of 
recidivism based on the offender’s criminal history, psychiatric evaluations, age, and facts of the 
underlying offense.”). 
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that elimination of waiver provisions can have on offenders.326 As court 
documents attest, this citizen of Maine was “a productive citizen” and 
“family man” who had no other arrests or convictions for sex offenses 
following his original conviction twenty years prior.327 He was “a good 
candidate” for waiver.328 But after Maine repealed its waiver provisions, 
he no longer had the ability to escape the registration requirements of 
the state’s sex offender statute.329 
This Article does not discount the fact that some sex offender 
registration statutes formally employ means that might relate rationally 
enough to the state’s interest in public safety.330 But as the District Court 
for the Southern District of New York warned, “The nature of the 
classification proceeding carries with it a high risk of error.”331 One 
citizen of Massachusetts received notice that the Massachusetts Sex 
Offender Registry Board was reviewing his case to make a 
recommendation regarding his duty to register twenty-two years after he 
had completed probation for a sexual offense.332 The board recognized 
that it could relieve him of the burdens of registration but it nonetheless 
refused to grant relief, despite the fact that he had not been convicted of 
any crime since he was discharged from probation twenty-two years 
previously333 and had been married for twenty-one years, raised three 
children, and established a stable life in the community.334 
The failure to provide for individualized assessment of the risk of 
reoffense is not the only aspect of super-registration schemes that 
renders them excessive. Today’s registration laws include unreasonable 
 
 326. See Doe v. Dist. Att’y, 932 A.2d at 563. 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. 
 330. See, e.g., Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1277–78 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that notification was 
limited in extent and carefully controlled, with protections against misuses of the information); Doe v. 
Sex Offender Registry Bd., 882 N.E.2d 298, 300 (Mass. 2008) (quoting 803 Mass. Code Regs. § 1.01 
(2002) (“The Sex Offender Registry Board shall mail to the sex offender a letter notifying him of his 
right to submit Documentary Evidence relative to his risk of reoffense, the degree of dangerousness 
posed to the public and his duty to register. Any documents submitted by the offender shall become 
part of his file as compiled by the Board in making its recommendation. The offender shall submit 
such Documentary Evidence to the Board within 30 calendar days of receiving his notification.”)). 
 331. Doe v. Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). The court discussed the classification 
hearing of one “borderline mentally retarded” offender, who appeared without a lawyer and was not 
informed of his right to a lawyer, and at which the hearing examiners read from a document stating the 
facts of a different offender’s case. Id. at 475; see Smith v. State, 2009-1765U, p. 7 (La. App. 1 Cir. 
3/26/10) (noting that a hearing was never held, even though Louisiana’s sex offender law requires an 
offender be given an opportunity to challenge his reclassification). 
 332. Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 882 N.E.2d at 300. 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. 
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reporting and expansive notification requirements that apply to 
individuals convicted of a broad spectrum of ever-changing crimes.335 
When viewed individually, the requirements may seem rationally 
related to public safety, but when viewed together, registration schemes 
paint a picture of excessiveness. As Alaska’s Supreme Court noted, “It is 
significant that the registration and re-registration requirements are 
demanding and intrusive and are of a long duration.”336 Convicted sex 
offenders are required to register for longer periods of time, required to 
provide more information than originally contemplated by the first wave 
of registration statutes, and are subject to extensive and automatic 
notification requirements.337 They have been transformed into a nomadic 
subset of the population struggling to find a place to put down roots in 
light of demanding residency restrictions.338 
By imposing registration and notification requirements on all 
convicted sex offenders, states impliedly communicate to the public that 
each of those offenders poses a substantial risk to society.339 Thus, “[a]ll 
registrants, including those who have successfully rehabilitated, will 
naturally be viewed as potentially dangerous persons by their neighbors, 
co-workers, and the larger community.”340 And here lies one key flaw: 
Because registration laws and community notification statutes are 
overinclusive, they are rendered excessive and consequently punitive. 
What has accounted for a difference so fundamental that it shifts the 
structure of registration from risk-based to offense-based? While one can 
point to Congress’s enactment of the AWA in 2006341 as the genesis for 
the change, this Article argues that the shift actually can be traced to the 
Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Connecticut Department of Public 
Safety,342 which was handed down the same day as Smith v. Doe.343 There, 
 
 335. See supra Part I.C (detailing the extensive changes in registration schemes). 
 336. Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1017 (Alaska 2008) (footnote omitted). 
 337. See supra Part I (describing registration and notification burdens). 
 338. See supra Part I.D. 
 339. State v. Letalien, 985 A.3d 4, 23 (Me. 2009); see Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind. 
2009) (finding the Indiana registration scheme fundamentally flawed, in part because it was “so broad 
and sweeping”). Sex offender statutes are also underinclusive in light of their purported purpose 
because they do not apply to individuals charged with sexual offenses but are acquitted or to 
individuals whose conviction is vacated or overturned. See Doe v. State, 189 P.3d at 1015. At both ends 
of the spectrum, sex offender registration laws fail to accomplish their purported goals; Wallace, 905 
N.E.2d at 381–83 (noting that a registration scheme that applies to individuals convicted of a sexual 
offense and individuals charged with but not convicted of a sexual offense favors a finding that the 
scheme is nonpunitive because its application is based on criminal conduct rather than criminal 
conviction). 
 340. Letalien, 985 A.2d at 23. The Letalien court continued, “It is unknown to what extent this 
reality will impair the opportunity for rehabilitated offenders to reintegrate and become productive 
members of society.” Id. at 23–24. 
 341. Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 
42 U.S.C. (2010)). 
 342. 538 U.S. 1, 1 (2003). 
Carpenter_24 (J. Grantz) (Do Not Delete) 4/19/2012 6:23 PM 
May 2012] SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION LAWS 1121 
the Court affirmed Connecticut’s decision to include all sex offenders on 
a public registry, without regard to individualized risk assessment or 
danger.344 The Court wrote, “[T]he fact that respondent seeks to prove—
that he is not currently dangerous—is of no consequence under 
Connecticut’s Megan’s Law.”345 Conviction alone triggers registration 
and notification,346 and Connecticut’s decision to publicly post all 
registrants’ information, whether dangerous or not, also constituted a 
valid exercise of its authority.347 
Although Connecticut Department of Public Safety presented on a 
narrow ground of procedural due process,348 the case is, nonetheless, 
disturbing for the message it imparts. In upholding a system of sex 
offender notification that does not distinguish among registrants, the Court 
signaled the constitutional legitimacy of broad-based, overinclusive 
registries. The Eighth Circuit followed the Supreme Court’s lead, finding 
that categorical application of Iowa’s registration and notification 
requirements did not render Iowa’s sex offender statute excessive in 
relation to its nonpunitive purpose.349 Classifying an individual as a sex 
offender remains automatic even though “one sexually oriented 
conviction, without more, may not predict future behavior”350 
Presumed dangerousness is the controlling assumption. The 
systematic refusal to assess the relative risk of each offender, or to enable 
the registrant to seek waiver or early termination of registration 
requirements, warrants reexamination of whether these super-registration 
schemes remain rationally connected to their purported goals. Recently, 
a few courts have criticized the lack of rational connection,351 but other 
 
 343. 538 U.S. 84, 84 (2003).  
 344. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 538 U.S. at 3–4; see Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 103–04 (“The Ex 
Post Facto Clause does not preclude a State from making reasonable categorical judgments that 
conviction of specified crimes should entail particular regulatory consequences.”). 
 345. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 538 U.S. at 7 (emphasis added). 
 346. Id. 
 347. Id. at 7–8. The Court did leave the door open for a future substantive due process challenge. 
See id. at 8 (“[W]e express no opinion as to whether Connecticut’s Megan’s Law violates principles of 
substantive due process.”). 
 348. Id. 
 349. Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 721–22 (8th Cir. 2005) (reasoning that the absence of a 
particularized risk assessment did not convert Iowa’s residency restrictions into a punitive measure 
because “[t]he Ex Post Facto Clause does not preclude a State from making reasonable categorical 
judgments that conviction of specified crimes should entail particular regulatory consequences” 
(quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 103)). 
 350. Bertram v. State, 2009-Ohio-5210U, ¶ 24 (Ct. App.) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. 
Eppinger, 743 N.E.2d 881, 886 (2001)). 
 351. See, e.g., State v. Pollard, 908 N.E.2d 1145, 1153 (Ind. 2009) (“Restricting the residence of 
offenders based on conduct that may have nothing to do with crimes against children, and without 
considering whether a particular offender is a danger to the general public, the statute exceeds its non-
punitive purposes.”); Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind. 2009) (“[W]e think it significant for 
this excessiveness inquiry that the Act provides no mechanism by which a registered sex offender can 
petition the court for relief from the obligation of continued registration and disclosure. . . . Thus, the 
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courts continue to find that sex offender statutes are not excessive in 
relation to their non-punitive purposes,352 relying on the Supreme Court’s 
assertion in Smith v. Doe that “[a] statute is not deemed punitive simply 
because it lacks a close or perfect fit with the nonpunitive aims it seeks to 
advance.”353 Yet the Smith reasoning should not persist, because it fails to 
address the impact of extensive expansion of regulations on the rational 
connection between registration schemes and their purported goals. 
IV.  Is the Time Ripe for a Successful 
Due Process Challenge? 
Challenging sex offender registration laws under due process can be 
a daunting task—possibly more so than an ex post facto analysis that 
relies on the analytical framework of the multifaceted test of Mendoza-
Martinez.354 A due process challenge faces greater hurdles because of its 
narrow yet amorphous underpinnings.355 As the Court wrote in County of 
Sacramento v. Lewis, “Rules of due process are not . . . subject to 
mechanical application . . . . [O]ur concern with preserving the 
constitutional proportions of substantive due process demands an exact 
analysis of [context and] circumstances . . . .”356 
A. Making the Case for Substantive Due Process Rights 
At its heart, substantive due process was “intended to secure the 
individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.”357 
 
non-punitive purpose of the Act, although of unquestioned importance, does not serve to render as 
non-punitive a statute that is so broad and sweeping.”); Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437, 446 
(Ky. 2009) (“Given the drastic consequences of Kentucky's residency restrictions, and the fact that 
there is no individual determination of the threat a particular registrant poses to public safety, we can 
only conclude that [Kentucky’s residency restriction] is excessive with respect to the nonpunitive 
purpose of public safety.”); Doe v. Dist. Att’y, 932 A.2d 552, 563 (Me. 2007) (“[T]he fact that a sex 
offender never has the ability to escape the registration requirements of the current SORNA, 
regardless of behavior, consequences, or contributions following the conviction, strikes us as having 
the capability to be excessive and as diverging from the purpose of protecting the public.”). 
 352. A review of federal case law offers a sobering look at how entrenched the view is that 
registration and notification statutes are not punitive. See, e.g., United States v. Leach, 639 F.3d 769, 
773 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. George, 625 F.3d 1124, 1131 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
DiTomasso, 621 F.3d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v. Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151, 158–59 (3d Cir. 
2010); United States v. Guzman, 591 F.3d 83, 94 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Young, 585 F.3d 199, 
203–06 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 466 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202, 1207 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 936 (10th Cir. 
2008); United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912, 919–20 (8th Cir. 2008).  
 353. 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003). 
 354. For excellent analyses of all seven factors, see Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 379–84, and State v. 
Letalien, 985 A.3d 4, 18–24 (Me. 2009). 
 355. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 168 (1952) (iterating that courts must subject 
substantive due process claims “to the very narrow scrutiny which the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment authorizes”). 
 356. 523 U.S. 833, 850 (1998) (emphasis added). 
 357. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884) (quoting Bank of Columbia v. Okley, 17 U.S. 
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Challenges are difficult to sustain, however, because of the Court’s 
unwillingness to expand protections beyond traditional fundamental 
interests.358 In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court reiterated, “[W]e 
‘ha[ve] always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due 
process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this 
unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.’”359 Consequently, the 
Court has held firm to the proposition that the right asserted must be 
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”360 or “implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty.”361 
Legislation that interferes with a fundamental right or liberty will 
survive constitutional scrutiny only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling state interest.362 Without a fundamental interest to anchor the 
inquiry, legislation will be deemed constitutional if it is rationally related 
to a legitimate governmental interest.363 Successful challenges under the 
rational basis test are rare because great deference is afforded to the 
legislative authority to craft and define laws.364 Indeed, so difficult is the 
burden that scholars evoked surprise when the Court in Lawrence v. 
Texas overturned a Texas sodomy law365 without first finding a traditional 
fundamental interest.366 
For the sex offender, a substantive due process claim is especially 
problematic.367 Registrants can rely on neither sympathy nor case 
 
(4 Wheat) 235, 241 (1819)). 
 358. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 703 (1997) (declaring that substantive due 
process analysis requires a “‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty interest” (quoting 
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993))). 
 359. Id. at 720 (alteration in original) (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 123 
(1992)); see Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994) (“The protections of substantive due process 
have for the most part been accorded to matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right 
to bodily integrity.”). 
 360. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977)).  
 361. Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). The Court in Glucksberg found 
that the right to end one’s life was not a fundamental one under this test. Id. at 728. 
 362. Id. at 721.  
 363. Id.  
 364. See, e.g., Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1345 (11th Cir. 2005) (“The rational basis standard is 
‘highly deferential’ and we hold legislative acts unconstitutional under a rational basis standard in only 
the most exceptional circumstances.” (citing Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 948 (11th Cir. 2001))). 
 365. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can 
justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”). 
 366. See, e.g., Wilson Huhn, The Jurisprudential Revolution: Unlocking Human Potential in 
Grutter and Lawrence, 12 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 65, 65 (2003) (“[T]he opinions of the Supreme 
Court in both Lawrence and Grutter work fundamental changes in the interpretation of our 
fundamental rights of liberty and equality.”); Kevin F. Ryan, A Flawed Performance, Vt. B.J., Fall 
2003, at 5, 6 (“The Court—or at least Justice Kennedy—has chosen to build jurisprudential castles on 
the most shifting of sands, if not on thin air.”). 
 367. See, e.g., Moore, 410 F.3d at 1343–44 (rejecting the registrant’s broad-based and general 
assertions of the privacy interests implicated in registering as a sex offender); see also Doe v. Mich. 
Dep’t of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 499–502 (6th Cir. 2007) (dismissing the plaintiffs’ substantive due 
process claim because it did not allege a sufficient privacy interest); In re W.M., 851 A.2d 431, 451 
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precedent for support.368 Perhaps in recognition of these obstacles,369 
offenders have been hesitant to bring substantive due process challenges, 
even when invited to do so.370 Yet, as observed by the Court in the 
landmark decision of Rochin v. California, adherence to substantive due 
process principles demands that governmental actions must not offend 
“canons of decency and fairness . . . even toward those charged with the 
most heinous offenses.”371 
Given the far-ranging burdens of super-registration schemes, a 
compelling argument can be made that under their auspices, 
governmental conduct no longer comports with traditional notions of 
decency and fair play. Members of the Court signaled their openness to 
such a challenge during the first generation of sex offender registration 
laws in Connecticut Department of Public Safety.372 Justice Souter, with 
Justice Ginsburg joining, stated, “[T]oday’s holding does not foreclose a 
claim that Connecticut’s dissemination of registry information is 
actionable on a substantive due process principle.”373 
Although mindful of the burdens placed on registrants, courts have 
nonetheless concluded that the schemes do not offend the canons of 
decency and fairness because any penalties associated with registration 
and notification mirror the consequences associated with the public’s 
knowledge of a conviction.374 Even if that assumption was accurate at one 
time, preceding sections of this Article have demonstrated that super-
registration schemes no longer abide by the notions of fair play espoused 
in Rochin. And although Rochin conjures images of brutal physical 
methods of government enforcement,375 it is the concept of overpowering 
 
(D.C. 2004) (“Since SORA does not threaten rights and liberty interests of a ‘fundamental’ order, 
appellants cannot succeed on their substantive due process challenge.”). 
 368. See Doe v. Tandeske, 361 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[P]ersons who have been convicted 
of serious sex offenses do not have a fundamental right to be free from . . . registration and notification 
requirements . . . .”); see also Moore, 410 F.3d at 1344 (emphasizing that a substantive due process 
challenge must show that a law either “directly or unduly burden[s] the fundamental rights claimed by 
Appellants”). 
 369. See, e.g., Moore, 410 F.3d at 1342–43 (emphasizing the reluctance to expand substantive due 
process protections); People v. Malchow, 714 N.E.2d 583, 589 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (concluding that no 
substantive due process violation occurred because the statute “bears a reasonable relationship to a 
public interest to be served”); In re Detention of Garren, 620 N.W.2d 275, 285 (Iowa 2000) (rejecting a 
substantive due process challenge by a sex offender challenging his civil confinement because of the 
“reasonable fit between the governmental purpose and the means chosen to advance that purpose”); 
Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 421–22 (N.J. 1995) (determining that disclosure of information does not 
violate substantive due process). 
 370. See, e.g., Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (reporting that the 
respondents “expressly disavow[ed] any reliance on the substantive component” of due process). 
 371. 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416–17 (1945)). 
 372. See 538 U.S. at 9 (Souter, J., concurring).  
 373. Id. 
 374. See supra notes 367–69 and accompanying text. 
 375. In Rochin, the government attempted to extract drugs from the defendant (who had swallowed 
them), first by forcible extraction and then by involuntary stomach pumping. See 342 U.S. at 166. 
Carpenter_24 (J. Grantz) (Do Not Delete) 4/19/2012 6:23 PM 
May 2012] SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION LAWS 1125 
governmental action that resonates. In Daniels v. Williams, the Court 
described the vital role that substantive due process plays in 
“prevent[ing] governmental power from being ‘used for purposes of 
oppression.’”376 Although Daniels did not concern the constitutionality of 
registration schemes, the Daniels description of oppression applies with 
equal force to registration schemes. 
The demonstration of governmental power is formidable. 
Registration burdens should not be viewed as isolated slices of 
prohibition; rather, they impact every aspect of life—where to live, 
where to work, where to travel, and with whom to associate. Indeed, 
there is no aspect of the sex offender’s life untouched by the imprint of 
registration and notification.377 With continually increasing burdens, the 
inability of registrants to argue for waiver, residency restrictions that bar 
the offender from many parts of the country, and a lack of serious and 
sustained judicial oversight, registration schemes serve primarily to 
enable the government to oppress the sex offender. The counter to such 
governmental domination, therefore, lies with the registrant’s ability to 
mount a successful due process challenge. 
B. Asserting Procedural Due Process Protections 
Even where no substantive due process violation exists as a result of 
the government’s interference with a registrant’s liberty interest, 
procedural due process nonetheless demands safeguards ensuring that 
the registrant’s liberty is not taken without due process of law.378 That 
generally translates to notice and an opportunity to be heard.379 
In the context of sex offender registration, the deprived liberty 
interest required to sustain a procedural due process challenge has been 
understood to mean the stigma and alteration of status that attach to 
registration and public dissemination of that information.380 Whether, and 
to what extent, however, reputation is a protected liberty interest that 
triggers procedural due process protections has been the subject of 
 
 376. 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 
59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 277 (1856)). 
 377. Even courts that have upheld the constitutionality of registration laws nevertheless recognize 
that registrants have an affected privacy interest. See Doe v. Tandeske, 361 F.3d 594, 596–97 (9th Cir. 
2004) (acknowledging the liberty interest of sex offenders). 
 378. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”). 
 379. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (finding that procedural due process 
requires an opportunity for a hearing before welfare benefits are terminated); Armstrong v. Manzo, 
380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965) (“It is clear that failure to give the petitioner notice of the pending adoption 
proceedings violated the most rudimentary demands of due process of law.”). 
 380. See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 6 (2003); see also Tandeske, 361 F.3d at 
596–97 (acknowledging that sex offenders have an affected liberty interest). 
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serious debate.381 As articulated by the Supreme Court in 1976 in Paul v. 
Davis, injury to reputation alone is insufficient.382 Concerned that a 
potential flood of federal litigation would arise if a state defamation case 
could be converted into an action for loss of liberty under the Due 
Process Clause, the Court in Paul concluded that stigma alone is not 
actionable.383 
And so was born the concept of “stigma plus,”384 which demands not 
only proof of injury to one’s reputation, but also that the injury was 
accompanied by the denial or curtailment of a tangible interest.385 
Although numerous cases pay homage to the “plus” part of the stigma-
plus test,386 courts have also acknowledged that outside Paul’s limited 
context, “it is not entirely clear what the ‘plus’ is.”387 
 
 381. Compare Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439 (1971) (holding that a state law that 
allowed a police chief to prohibit the sale of alcohol to a specified individual was invalid because it put 
a person’s “reputation . . . at stake” without notice and an opportunity to be heard), with Paul v. Davis, 
424 U.S. 693, 708 (1976) (holding that Constantineau did not rest on damage to reputation alone but 
also on the deprivation of the right to purchase alcohol). 
 382. 424 U.S. at 701. 
 383. Id. at 698–99 (expressing concern that without a limitation in place, § 1983 actions would open 
the door for a myriad of state defamation claims); see Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991) 
(reaffirming Paul in holding that injury to reputation alone was an insufficient liberty interest). 
 384. See Algarin v. Town of Wallkill, 421 F.3d 137, 138 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005) (tracing the origins of 
“stigma plus” to Paul); see Segal v. City of New York, 459 F.3d 207, 211 (2d Cir. 2006) (employing the 
term “stigma plus” to describe the plaintiff’s claim); Chisholm v. Ramia, 639 F. Supp. 2d 240, 242 (D. 
Conn. 2009) (“[The plaintiff alleges] deprivation of her liberty or property interest under a ‘stigma-
plus’ theory . . . .”). For scholarship on the use of the stigma-plus test, see Caroline Louise Lewis, The 
Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act: An 
Unconstitutional Deprivation of the Right to Privacy and Substantive Due Process, 31 Harv. C.R.-C.L. 
L. Rev. 89, 102 n.83 (1996) (“The net liberty infringement imposed by sex offender laws, together with 
the harm to released offenders’ reputations, appears sufficient to satisfy [the] ‘stigma-plus’ 
requirement.”); Kevin M. McKenna, The Tarkanian Decision: The State of College Athletics Is 
Everything but State Action, 40 DePaul L. Rev. 459, 482–83 (1991) (analyzing whether fired athletic 
coaches have suffered sufficiently under the stigma-plus test to find a substantive due process 
violation). 
 385. See Herrera v. Union No. 39 Sch. Dist., 975 A.2d 619, 624 (Vt. 2009) (“[N]o liberty-interest 
due process claim lies unless the individual experiences both the ‘stigma’ of defamatory statements 
and the ‘plus’ of adverse action by the government.”); see also Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 87 (2d Cir. 
2005) (defining the stigma-plus test to require injury to reputation coupled with a “state-imposed 
burden”); Smith ex rel. Smith v. Siegelman, 322 F.3d, 1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003) (iterating that the 
stigma-plus test requires proof of stigmatization “in connection with a denial of a right or status 
previously recognized under state law”). 
 386. See, e.g., Patterson v. City of Utica, 370 F.3d 322, 328 (2d Cir. 2004) (employing the test 
despite calling it a “still-evolving legal theory”); Jackson v. Heh, No. 98-4420, 2000 WL 761807, at *4 
(6th Cir. June 2, 2000) (“[T]he Supreme Court and federal courts of appeals have since embraced 
Paul’s ‘stigma-plus’ test.”); Univ. Gardens Apartments Joint Venture v. Johnson, 419 F. Supp. 2d 733, 
738 (D. Md. 2006) (“[The challenge is] commonly . . . referred to as a ‘stigma plus’ claim.”). 
 387. Neu v. Corcoran, 869 F.2d 662, 667 (2d Cir. 1989); see Boone v. Pa. Office of Vocational 
Rehab., 373 F. Supp. 2d 484, 497 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (“What satisfies the plus, however, is uncertain. 
Generally, the ‘plus’ is a termination of employment.” (quoting Ersek v. Twp. of Springfield, 102 F.3d 
79, 83 n.5 (3d Cir. 1996))). 
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Where loss of reputation is alleged, litigation centers on whether the 
stigmatizing statements produce an additional state-imposed burden.388 
Courts following Paul have narrowly interpreted this requirement, thus 
rejecting stigma-plus challenges where there was insufficient proof of an 
additional burden. Consequently, claims have been dismissed involving 
loss of goodwill;389 termination of at-will employment;390 removal from a 
bankruptcy panel;391 a prohibition against adopting a child, which 
resulted from the defamation;392 and where a “name-clearing hearing” 
was later held.393 
Against this backdrop of jurisprudence, registrants find themselves 
battling two fronts—trying to overcome the Court’s reluctance to expand 
the notion of what constitutes a protected liberty interest, and addressing 
conflicting case law on the proof required for the “plus” in the stigma-
plus test.394 But Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Paul in 
1976, may have foreshadowed this modern procedural due process 
challenge when he recalled Justice Stewart’s words from Cafeteria 
Workers v. McElroy: “[I]t is to be noted that this is not a case where 
government action has operated to bestow a badge of disloyalty or infamy, 
with an attendant foreclosure from other employment opportunity.”395 Forty 
years later, super-registration schemes have created just the kind of 
infamy accompanied by loss of a tangible right to which both Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice Stewart referred. 
The discussion of procedural due process safeguards in the context of 
community notification received short shrift in Connecticut Department of 
 
 388. See, e.g., Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety ex rel. Lee, 271 F.3d 38, 55 (2d Cir. 2001) (observing that 
the “plus” required “must at least entail some non-trivial state involvement”), rev’d sub nom. Conn. 
Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003); Mosrie v. Barry, 718 F.2d 1151, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
(asking whether the appellant was deprived of “some other interest that rises to constitutional 
status”). 
 389. Sadallah v. City of Utica, 383 F.3d 34, 38–39 (2d Cir. 2004); see WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 
197 F.3d 367, 374–376 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 390. Silva v. Worden, 130 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 391. Shaltry v. United States, No. 95-15340, 1995 WL 866862, at *5 (9th Cir. June 26, 1995). 
 392. Behrens v. Regier, 422 F.3d 1255, 1260–61 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that because the plaintiff 
had no recognized right under state law to adopt a child, being erroneously labeled a “verified child 
abuser” did not deprive him of a liberty interest). 
 393. Patterson v. City of Utica, 370 F.3d 322, 328 (2d Cir. 2004) (concluding that, although the 
name-clearing hearing in this case did not satisfy procedural due process, when properly conducted 
such a hearing bars substantive due process claim). 
 394. Some case law has suggested that the “plus” must be a protected property interest. See, e.g., 
Clark v. Twp. of Falls, 890 F.2d 611, 620 (3d Cir. 1989) (concluding that, because the plaintiff had no 
property interest in retaining his duties as a police lieutenant, there was no “alteration or 
extinguishment of any right or interest”). Other case law has indicated that less than a property 
interest would qualify. See, e.g., Doe v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(explaining that “loss of government employment or a foreclosure of future government employment 
opportunities” might suffice to meet the stigma-plus test). 
 395. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 705 (1976) (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 
(1961)). 
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Public Safety when registrants challenged their inclusion in the 
Connecticut online registry without a hearing to determine their 
individual dangerousness.396 There, the Court reversed the Second Circuit 
to hold that online registry postings did not violate procedural due 
process because the inclusion of the registrants was based on their prior 
convictions and not on their future dangerousness.397 The Court wrote, 
“[D]ue process does not require the opportunity to prove a fact that is 
not material to the State’s statutory scheme.”398 The obvious colorable 
fact that swayed the Court was the disclaimer posted on the registry 
stating that Connecticut had made “no determination that any individual 
included in the registry is currently dangerous.”399 
To be sure, the cost of individualized risk assessment is significant. 
And that fact alone may have led to the creation of the Connecticut 
model favored by super-registrations schemes. Bolstering the contention 
that individualized risk assessment is unnecessary, the Court relied on 
the same assumption it did in Smith v. Doe: any consequence that flows 
from online dissemination of an offender’s information is no different 
than that which generally flows from the public’s knowledge of any 
conviction.400 Since the website’s purpose was only to list the information 
of all sexual offenders, the Court agreed that there was no need to 
differentiate the risk levels of the offenders.401 
But online registries are different. Despite disclaimers or the courts’ 
reliance on them,402 registrants are at risk for retribution from the 
community. Reported cases demonstrate the causal connection between 
the attacks and the online registries.403 In 2006, for example, two men 
listed on Maine’s sex offender registry were targeted and murdered by a 
Canadian man who found the offenders’ personal information on 
 
 396. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 3–4 (2003). 
 397. Id. 
 398. Id. at 4. 
 399. Id. at 5 (quoting Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety ex rel. Lee, 271 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 400. Id. at 7. 
 401. Id. 
 402. See, e.g., Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1092 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[O]ur inquiry into the law’s 
effects cannot consider the possible ‘vigilante’ or illegal responses of citizens to notification. Such 
responses are expressly discouraged in the notification itself and will be prosecuted by the state. 
Indeed, courts must presume that law enforcement will obey the law and will protect offenders from 
vigilantism.” (citation omitted)); see also Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105 (2003) (noting with approval 
the inclusion of a warning that the use of information obtained from Alaska’s online registry to 
commit a criminal act against a registrant is subject to criminal prosecution); E.B. v. Verniero, 
119 F.3d 1077, 1104 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[E]ach notification is accompanied by a warning against misuse of 
the information conveyed and an assurance that any private violence will be prosecuted.”). 
 403. See, e.g., Man Who Shot at Home of Offender Is Sentenced, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1999, at 44; 
see also Small, supra note 3, at 1467–69 (1999) (highlighting incidents of harassment of and violence 
against registered sex offenders); Amy L. Van Duyn, The Scarlet Letter Branding: A Constitutional 
Analysis of Community Notification Provisions in Sex Offender Statutes, 47 Drake L. Rev. 635, 635–36 
(1999) (detailing the harassment and violence that results from community notification). 
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Maine’s online registry.404 Vigilante justice is a realistic concern that 
results from publicly labeling individuals as sex or violent offenders and 
disseminating their most personal information on the Internet. 
And so we stand torn between the need to notify the community of 
the presence of dangerous offenders, and awareness of the fact that too 
many offenders have been improperly swept into the mix. Let’s assume 
for the moment that Connecticut Department of Public Safety offered an 
accurate impression of registries at the launch of the global era of 
dissemination of information—that a disclaimer on the website was 
sufficient to offset any misconceptions regarding the relative danger of 
an individual post. Can it be argued convincingly that a disclaimer 
continues to afford the registrant sufficient protection, especially in light 
of the cascading and devastating consequences that flow from 
notification statutes? 
One need only consider the civil commitment case law by way of 
analogy. There, the deprivation of liberty in the form of a civil 
commitment has been upheld as constitutional, in large measure due to 
the significant procedural safeguards in place in making the civil 
commitment determination.405 In the landmark case Kansas v. Hendricks, 
the Supreme Court upheld a Kansas law that allowed the civil 
commitment of those who had been deemed sexually violent predators 
and who had been convicted of sexually violent offenses or, if not 
convicted, had been charged of such offenses but either acquitted or 
found unable to stand trial because of mental disease or defect.406 In so 
concluding, the Court emphasized that a prior conviction alone is 
insufficient to trigger civil commitment proceedings.407 In fact, Justice 
Stevens underscored this key point in his dissent in Smith v. Doe when he 
stated, “While one might disagree in other respects with Hendricks, it is 
clear that a conviction standing alone did not make anyone eligible for 
the burden imposed by that statute.”408 
Recasting the model of notification is the first step. Overinclusion—
the Connecticut model—while intended to convey information that is not 
discriminatory among sex offenders, is especially problematic for its lack 
of discrimination. Under this model, all offenders are viewed as equally 
 
 404. Doe v. Dist. Att’y, 932 A.2d 552, 568–69 (Me. 2007) (Alexander & Silver, JJ., concurring) 
(“Reports of other murders, assaults, and harassment abound.”). 
 405. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 352 (1997) (describing the procedures necessary to 
initiate commitment). 
 406. Id. at 357–58 (upholding the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-
29a03(a) (1994)). See Nora V. Demleitner, Abusing State Power or Controlling Risk?: Sex Offender 
Commitment and Sicherungverwahrung, 30 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1621 (2003), for a discussion of the 
civil commitment of sex offenders and the legitimacy of the state’s authority to control future 
dangerousness. 
 407. Hendricks, 521 U.S at 352. 
 408. 538 U.S. 84, 113 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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dangerous, and the public, unschooled in the distinctions of varying 
levels of registration, condemns them equally. Taking a cue from 
Hendricks, therefore, online registries should be reserved for only the 
most dangerous of sex offenders—a subclass similar to that actually 
envisioned by the Court in Hendricks.409 
V.  Enough Is Enough: Three Courts Speak Out 
As this Article has demonstrated, super-registration schemes have 
flourished with relative impunity. Despite legislation that includes 
harsher registration and notification burdens, the inability of registrants 
to contest classification, and retroactive application to previously 
convicted offenders, courts maintain that these registration schemes are, 
nonetheless, civil regulatory laws.410 
But times might be changing. Slowly, courts have begun to 
appreciate the devastating picture painted by current sex offender 
registration laws. In a relatively short timeframe, the supreme courts of 
Indiana, Maine, and Ohio have said, “Enough is enough.” Each court 
reached the conclusion that its state’s serially amended scheme is no 
longer worthy of the designation “civil regulation.”411 In State v. Williams, 
the Supreme Court of Ohio summed up well this dawning realization: 
No one change compels our conclusion that [the new registration 
scheme] is punitive. . . . When we consider all the changes enacted by 
[Senate Bill] 10 in aggregate, we conclude that imposing the current 
registration requirements on a sex offender whose crime was 
committed prior to the enactment of [Senate Bill] 10 is punitive.412 
A review of the Ohio Supreme Court’s jurisprudence serves to 
illustrate the court’s transition from its finding that the state’s 
registration laws were constitutionally regulatory to its discovery of their 
unconstitutionally punitive nature, a transition that mirrors the judicial 
evolutions that have occurred in Maine413 and Indiana.414 Ohio’s version 
of Megan’s Law was first enacted in 1996.415 As early as 1998, the statute 
 
 409. 521 U.S. at 357 (stressing that civil commitment was only intended for “a limited subclass of 
dangerous persons”). 
 410. See supra note 352 (reviewing federal court decisions concluding that sex offender statutes are 
civil regulations). 
 411. See Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 378 (Ind. 2009); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 26 (Me. 
2009); State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1113 (Ohio 2011). 
 412. 952 N.E.2d at 1113. 
 413. See Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 384 (concluding that, as amended, Indiana’s Sex Offender and 
Registration Act no longer is rationally connected to its civil purpose and therefore violates ex post 
facto principles); see also Hevner v. State, 919 N.E.2d 109 (Ind. 2010) (finding that retroactive 
application of Indiana’s amended registration scheme to a newly incorporated sex offense violates ex 
post facto principles). 
 414. See Letalien, 985 A.2d at 24–26 (determining that Maine’s serially amended registration 
scheme no longer is constitutional). 
 415. Williams, 952 N.E.2d at 1110. 
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was challenged in State v. Cook as a violation of the prohibition against 
ex post facto legislation.416 However, Ohio’s Supreme Court found that 
the statute “serve[d] the solely remedial purpose of protecting the 
public.”417 The Cook court reasoned that the registration and address 
verification procedures were “de minimis procedural requirements” 
necessary to achieve the statute’s remedial goals.418 And this was the logic 
to which the Ohio Supreme Court clung for over fourteen years.419 Even 
after the statute was “significantly amended” by Senate Bill 5, the court 
continued to rely on Cook.420 
But when addressing Senate Bill 10, which further modified Ohio’s 
registration scheme in 2007, Ohio’s highest court appreciated that it was 
faced with a dramatically altered statutory scheme. Comparing the 
significant changes effected by Senate Bill 10 to the requirements of its 
predecessor Senate Bill 5, the Williams court paints a picture of excessive 
regulation.421 No longer convinced that Ohio’s statute was remedial, even 
though some elements of it remain so, the court determined that, in the 
aggregate, the scheme was punitive and thus violated ex post facto 
principles when applied to an offender convicted prior to the Bill’s 
enactment.422 
Neither one change, nor one amendment, nor one alteration 
compelled the court’s conclusion in Williams: “It is a matter of degree 
whether a statute is so punitive that its retroactive application is 
unconstitutional.”423 Williams does not inhibit the Ohio General 
Assembly’s authority to pass legislation in order to protect the public 
from sex offenders within the confines of the state’s constitution.424 
 
 416. 700 N.E.2d 570, 573 (Ohio 1998). 
 417. Id. at 585. 
 418. Id. at 578. 
 419. See, e.g., State v. Eppinger, 743 N.E.2d 881, 888 (Ohio 2001) (upholding Ohio’s sex offender 
registration statute and stressing the importance of statutorily provided classification hearings and the 
significance of classifying an offender appropriately); State v. Williams, 728 N.E.2d 342, 355 (Ohio 
2000) (holding that Ohio’s sex offender statute constituted “reasonable legislation” despite the impact 
it had on the lives of sex offenders because it “addresses legitimate governmental interests without a 
detrimental effect on individual constitutional rights”).  
 420. Williams, 952 N.E.2d at 1111; see, e.g., State v. Ferguson, 896 N.E.2d 110, 118–19 (Ohio 2008), 
(holding that Ohio’s statute did not violate the ban on retroactive legislation because Senate Bill 5 did 
not alter the essentially regulatory purpose of the statute established in Cook, even if it made more 
burdensome the registration requirements and more extensive the notification provisions); State v. 
Wilson, 865 N.E.2d 1264, ¶¶ 1270–71 (Ohio 2007) (relying on Cook in finding that Ohio’s sex offender 
statute did not constitute ex post facto legislation because the legislation was remedial and was a 
reasonable measure designed to protect the public). But see State v. Williams, 868 N.E.2d 969, 971 
(Ohio 2007) (reasoning that the court of appeals’ reliance on Cook was misplaced in this case because 
the “simple” registration and notification at issue in Cook had been amended to make an offender’s 
failure to verify his current address a crime). 
 421. 952 N.E.2d at 1112–13. 
 422. Id. at 1113. 
 423. Id. (citing Cook, 700 N.E.2d at 582). 
 424. Id. 
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Similarly, neither the Supreme Court of Indiana’s decision in Wallace v. 
State nor the Supreme Court of Maine’s decision in State v. Letalien 
questions a legislature’s ability to institute a registration system in order 
to protect the public.425 Instead, these decisions serve as a reminder that 
spiraling amendments can undermine the civil regulatory aim of a 
registration scheme.426 
Conclusion 
So where does that leave us? It may feel good—even righteous—to 
single out sex offenders for particular treatment in an effort to protect 
the community. But history has shown that a collective response to a 
national problem concerning safety and security does not necessarily 
make it the right one.427 This Article demonstrates that ramped-up 
registration schemes, designed to appease a fearful public, are no longer 
rationally connected to their regulatory purpose, thus transforming the 
legislation into criminal penalties cloaked in civil rhetoric. 
Recent stirrings in state courts offer hope of retrenchment. Wallace, 
Letalien, and Williams have filled a judicial void with articulate analysis 
of the evolution of the schemes’ unconstitutionality. Yet one must be 
mindful that, at least in the case of Wallace and Williams, these holdings 
rested on state, rather than federal, constitutional grounds. Collectively, 
then, these cases may prove inadequate to command a paradigmatic shift 
in the public and legislative response to the perceived dangers of sex 
offenders. 
Seminal Supreme Court decisions remind us that sometimes only 
the highest court can redirect the national conversation and bring about 
change in national behavior.428 It is time to reexamine Smith v. Doe and 
Connecticut Department of Public Safety and their attendant assumptions. 
Most important, it is time to provide meaningful guidance on the 
parameters that will support the states’ interest in keeping their 
communities safe while providing constitutional protections to offenders. 
 
 425. See Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 383 (Ind. 2009); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 26 (Me. 
2009). 
 426. Even prior to Senate Bill 10’s enactment, Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger recognized the 
significant restraint on liberty imposed by Ohio’s sex offender statute and argued that it was punitive. 
State v. Ferguson, 896 N.E.2d 110, 122–24 (Ohio 2008) (Lanzinger, J. dissenting). 
 427. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215–16 (1944) (describing the United 
States’ decision to force Japanese-Americans into internment camps during World War II). As Justice 
Thurgood Marshall observed, “History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in times of 
urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure.” Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. 
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 428. Throughout the Court’s jurisprudence, there are a number of noteworthy cases that changed 
the national conversation. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (redefining liberty to 
include sexual autonomy); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966) (changing the practice of 
police interrogations); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954) (declaring the importance of 
moving beyond basic facts “to the effect of segregation itself on public education”).  
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The dissenting words of Judge Damon Keith in Doe v. Bredesen ring 
especially true in light of the current legislative landscape: “We must be 
careful, in our rush to condemn one of the most despicable crimes in our 
society, not to undermine the freedom and constitutional rights that 
make our nation great.”429 
 
 429. 521 F.3d 680, 681 (6th Cir. 2008) (Keith, J., dissenting). 
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